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Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal
Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy
Carol M. Rose t
Land use control in America has always been an intensely local
area of the law. Modem land use law, with its roots in the turn-of-the-
century City Beautiful movement, was intended to deal especially with
the growing population concentrations of urban localities.' From the
beginning, those localities and their governments were implicitly
deemed the appropriate agencies for planning and ordering the physi-
cal development associated with their own startling growth.2 But dur-
ing the last two decades, judges and legal scholars have shown
increasing doubt that local governments make land development deci-
sions fairly and rationally-that is, with a reasonable distribution of
burdens among individuals, and with the care and deliberation com-
mensurate with the long-term implications of land development
t Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Acting Professor of
Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.A. 1962, Antioch College;
M.A. 1963, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1969, Cornell University; J.D. 1977, University of Chi-
cago School of Law. A number of people have read and commented on earlier drafts of this
paper. For their very helpful criticisms and suggestions I owe special thanks to Steve Barnett,
Robert Ellickson, David Feller, Willy Fletcher, Gerald Frug, Tom Grey, Phyllis Palmer, Len
Rubinowitz, and Sho Sato. All errors, of course, are purely my own.
1. See, e.g., Baker, Zoning Legislation, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 164 (1926); Young, City Planning
and Restrictions on the Use of Property, 9 MINN. L. REv. 518, 519-20 (1925); see also Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
2. Baker, supra note 1, at 166; M. SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 101
(1969).
3. The idea of fairness as a matter of even distribution of burdens does not seem to have
changed substantially in recent years. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
416 (1922), with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). But the idea of rationality has
changed somewhat more. Perhaps under the influence of law and economics thinking, commenta-
tors have increasingly focused "rationality" discussions on the issue of efficiency; that is, a rational
regulation is one, roughly speaking, whose benefits outweigh its costs. See, e.g., Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1215 (1967); Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest, in PUB-
LIC INTEREST LAW 4 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978). Because of the difficulties of assessing costs and
benefits in environmental issues, such as land use, see infra notes 288, 319 and accompanying text,
I use "rational" to mean "careful" or "duly considered," and thus address efficiency only indi-
rectly, in that a carefully considered measure is likely to be efficient. The courts also normally
treat the efficiency issues only indirectly, leaving cost-benefit analyses to regulatory bodies at least
initially on the assumption that those bodies are institutionally competent to weigh costs and
benefits carefully. See infra notes 58-62 (legislative competence) & 130-32 (administrative compe-
tence). On "institutional competence," see Freedman, Book Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 307
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This doubt stems from several causes and takes different forms.
Much of the criticism concentrates on the extralocal effects of local
land use decisions, particularly the exclusion of low income outsiders,
and the shifting of environmental problems to neighboring communi-
ties.' But an older criticism has cut even deeper, and is the subject of
(1976) (reviewing S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
POWER (1975)).
4. The increased vulnerability of local land regulations is attributable in part to the civil
rights movement and antipoverty efforts of the 1960's. These efforts focused attention on the
cumulative consequences of what had until then seemed to be benevolent land controls: local
"tight little islands," in their over-concentration on adequate space and on capacious and well-
built single family homes, in effect used land decisions to exclude the minorities and the poor who
could only afford more modest quarters. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 58-59, 149-52 (1966);
Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767 (1969).
From a different perspective, environmentalism heightened national awareness of other con-
sequences of local land use decisions allowing too much new development, e.g., downstream sil-
tification, increased auto fumes, and the loss of historical landmarks and fragile ecosystems. See,
e.g., R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES 17-29 (2d ed. 1979); F. POPPER, THE
POLITICS OF LAND USE REFORM 46-55 (1981); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 1-3 (1971).
Civil rights and environmental complaints about local land decisions could easily be framed
in the economists' language of "externalities," in that they focused on decisions that imposed costs
on persons and resources outside the local boundaries. R. BABCOCK, supra, at 146; F. POPPER,
supra, at 49. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (refusal to rezone to permit an integrated housing project), on remand, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1974) (zoning ordinance prohibiting multi-family dwellings), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975); Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d 486, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 36 (1977) (environmental excise tax affecting housing projects); Daniels v. Borough of Point
Pleasant, 23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957) (exaction of tribute in the form of public improvements
from new developers and their new residents). See also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981) (dumping of local sewage into other cities' drinking water); Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385, 429, 475-89 (1977) (development changes). In all these instances, the outsiders
had to pay the costs of local land use decisions, without sharing the benefits or having any say in
selecting the decisionmakers. For the critics, such instances showed the need for sharper supervi-
sion by legislatures and courts over parochial, ill-considered, or self-serving local land decisions.
R. BABCOCK, supra, at 154-74; Delogu, The Dilemma of Local Land Use Control.- Power Without
Responsibility, 33 ME. L. REV. 15 (1981); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra, at 3; see also
R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra, at 7-13; F. POPPER, supra, at 15-16.
To cope with these extra-local spillover effects, some state legislatures have responded in the
last decade with a "Quiet Revolution" in land use statutes, bringing much greater state oversight
over local regulations. The name comes from U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra. For
more recent descriptions of these state and regional programs, see R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG,
supra, and F. POPPER, supra. Such statutes, together with far-reaching court decisions in some
jurisdictions have imposed a new duty on local governments to match their planning and regula-
tions to wider regional and state needs. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater
Eastbay, Inc., v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (injunc-
tion against ordinance prohibiting future building permits); Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975).
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this Article. It is that we need a new jurisprudence of local land deci-
sions, not because of the external consequences of those decisions-
serious though they may be-but because local governments cannot be
trusted to deal fairly or carefully even in land decisions with only local
consequences.5
Since the middle 1960's, legal scholars have complained that local
land decisions can make a mockery of orderly and predictable planned
development. Individual land decisions, the critics say, amount to
deals with landowners and developers; these deals gut the local plan (if
indeed any exists) and are merely ad hoc impulse choices that neither
safeguard the surroundings for present and future residents, nor enable
those residents and would-be developers to predict future actions.6
These critics object most to the piecemeal changes in local land
regulations: the all-pervasive "variance,"7 the "conditional use per-
mit,"8 or the small-scale "rezoning" ordinance.9 These small adjust-
ments are the everyday fare of local land regulations. Whatever the
formal designation, any of these ad hoc adjustments alters preexisting
general regulations governing the use of some individual parcel or
other finite area within the community. Each such change is small on
its face, appearing to have little effect outside the immediate commu-
nity and to concern only the individual developer, the neighboring
owners, and the local government.
5. On judicial suspicion of local decisionmaking, see D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DI-
LEMMA 104 (1971); Sullivan, From Kroner to Fasano: An Anaysis of Judicial Review of Land Use
Regulation in Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 358, 364-66 (1974); Tarlock, Consistency with Adopted
Land Use Plans as a StandardofJudicialReview The Case Against, 9 URB. L. ANN. 69, 75, 88-101
(1975).
6. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, supra note 4, at 7-16, 130-33; Heyman, Innovative Land Regula-
tion and Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 183, 187-200 (1972). See also R. EL-
LICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 234-76 (1981) (refering to pattern of zoning
changes as "dealmaking"); NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING REFORMS: MINIMIZING THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUP-
TION 6 (1979) ("negotiated zoning" a source of corruption) [hereinafter cited as MINIMIZING THE
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION].
7. A variance is in theory an exception to a zoning regulation granted where, because of
circumstances unique to a particular property, strict enforcement of the existing regulation would
cause special hardship. In practice they have often been freely granted. See generally D.
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 196-206 (1971).
8. A "conditional use" or "special" permit allows a structure or use not permitted as of
right within a given zone, but foreseen as permissible in limited numbers or with special condi-
tions within that zone. For example, a church may be allowed within a residential zone as a
"conditional use." See generalo D. HAGMAN, supra note 7, at 206-11. The discretionary charac-
ter of such special permits makes them attractive to municipalities wishing to exercise case-by-case
control. For one municipality's unsuccessful effort to require virtually all development to proceed
via conditional use permits, see People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 881, 29 Cal. Rptr. 781
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1963).
9. Such ordinances are normally amendments to more general zoning ordinances. See, e.g.,
Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1961).
1983]
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The problem with these small changes, critics charge, is that they
are so difficult to control. Judicial review of small changes is limited.
Traditionally, they were tested only within the ample girth of a loose
reasonableness standard. 10 This was particularly true where individual
properties were reclassified through actual amendments to the ordi-
nances; these rezonings, as "legislative" acts, were insulated from close
review by the courts, which required only that they not be arbitrary.tt
But the arbitrariness standard cannot really control small changes. It is
too broad to treat seriously the fairness claims of the individual prop-
erty owners with interests at stake in piecemeal changes, and it fails to
account for the cumulative effect of many nonarbitrary decisions that
seem to shave away, in salami slices, any larger concepts underlying the
original, more general land regulations.
Thus, the traditional legislative reasonableness standard is inade-
quate to assure fairness and due consideration. Minor regulatory
changes seem impervious to other, nonjudicial controls as well, includ-
ing most of the land use reform ideas of the last decade. The state and
regional controls in the so-called "Quiet Revolution" statutes are
meant to monitor only the regional impact of local changes, not to dis-
turb local discretion over individual parcel changes lacking wider
ramifications.' 2 Similarly, new state statutes requiring environmental
review of proposed changes only add to local discretion over piecemeal
10. 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 25.26 (1977). See also Bryden, Zoning:
Rigid, Flexible, or Fluid?, 44 J. URn. L. 287, 301 (1967); Griffin & Becker, Zoning, Kentucky Law
Survey, 67 Ky. L.J. 627, 655-56 (1978-79).
11. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). Permissive substantive
and procedural standards are also applied in variance and conditional use decisions. See 3 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 20.01.
It is noteworthy that the designation "legislative" has long troubled the courts. See, e.g.,
Borough of Creskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954); Eves v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960); see also Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 Ill. 2d 415,
419-24, 186 N.E.2d 529, 531-32 (1962) (Klingbiel, J., concurring). The older prohibitions on so-
called "spot zoning" were often directed at piecemeal changes that appeared to give special privi-
leges to a particular owner or property. See, e.g., Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.
1961). See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 5.11 (1976); Note, Spot Zoning and the
Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 303 (1959). Many courts have noted that decisions
revolving around highly individual ownership interests hardly fit the normal conception of gener-
alized legislation. See, e.g., Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 67, 217 A.2d 578,
585 (1966).
12. For remarks on the Quiet Revolution, see supra note 4. Continued local predominance
is acknowledged even by the chief spokesmen for the Quiet Revolution. See U.S. COUNCIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 4, at 3. See also R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 133-34,
251; R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE STATES AND LAND-USE CONTROL 47 (1975);
DeGrove, The Political Dynamics of the Land and Growth Management Movement, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 140 (1979); Pelham, Regulating Developments of Regional lmpact: Florida
and the Model Code, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 789, 803, 814-15 (1977).
Indeed, the ultimate impact of the "Revolution" may be to strengthen the local grip on land
regulation. Callies, he Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 135, 136, 139 (1980).
[Vol. 71:837
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changes,1 3 and in the view of one commentator even serve to legitimize
ad hoc local decisions. 14 Another set of ideas, the self-styled "deregula-
tion" proposals, embraces a variety of approaches, but they all envision
a fairly high residue of local regulatory authority, and some even aim
at freeing local discretion from state or regional supervision. 5 Finally,
13. The first of these was California's Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 21000-21175 (West Supp. 1982). For a discussion of local discretion under this and similar
acts, see, for example, NAACP Santa Rosa-Sonoma County Branch v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 102,
111-12 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
See generally DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process.- Empirical
Findings, Remaining Issues and a Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409; DiMento,
Citizen Environmental Legislation in the States: An Overview, 53 J. URB. L. 413 (1976); Pearlman,
State Environmental Policy Acts: Local Decision Making and Land Use Planning, 43 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 42 (1977).
14. Hagman, NEP,4s Progeny Inhabit the States-Were the Genes Defective?, 7 URn. L.
ANN. 3, 35-36 (1974).
15. Perhaps the best-known and most persistent advocate of deregulation is Bernard Siegan.
See B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 71 (1970). See also Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Develop-
ment System, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 28 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Kmiec, Deregulation]; Lefcoe,
Calfornia's Land Planning Requirements: The Case for Deregulation, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 447
(1981); Nelson,A Private Property Right Theory of Zoning, 11 UPB. LAW. 713, 729 (1979) (favoring
deregulation of undeveloped land). Deregulation is a misnomer for some of these proposals.
Lefcoe's "deregulation" is largely directed against state intrusions on local autonomy. Kmiee's
"deregulation" is based explicitly on Henry George's "single tax" on real estate value, and would
restructure local land use regulation into an in-kind taxation on the development value of land:
developers would chose among a group of locally defined development models, and then provide
public improvements at a value roughly equal to the difference between the developed and unde-
veloped value of the land. This siphoning off of development value hardly seems to give much
comfort to the usual audience for deregulation. In addition, Kmiec contemplates considerable
dickering between developers and local regulators. For a brief synopsis of his proposal, see
Kmiec, The Role of the Planner in a Deregulated World, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 1982,
at 4. Siegan uses Houston as an example of a city without zoning, but Houston certainly has a
variety of land use regulations. See B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 26-33 (1972). In-
deed, now that land control is moving into previously unregulated rural counties and as Houston
(once the Mecca of deregulators) has finally adopted a zoning ordinance, deregulation seems an
unlikely vehicle for controlling local discretion in piecemeal changes. For Houston's current
move toward zoning, see King, Houston's Council Tries to Control City Growth, N.Y. Times, June
23, 1982, at A12, col. I. On the expansion of land use regulation in unincorporated areas, see
Weber & Peroff, Local Government Responses to State-Mandated Land Use Laws, 43 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 352 (1977). Deregulation takes another form in proposals for "enterprise zones," that
is, high unemployment areas in which tax breaks and some land use regulatory concessions are
allowed in order to attract businesses. See generally Note, Enterprise Zones. New Life for the
Inner City, 4 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 243 (1981). Such schemes presume the continuation of
land regulation outside the enterprise zones, however, otherwise regulatory relief would have no
appeal to the industries to be lured. Perhaps the most important argument for deregulation is that
land use regulations raise the cost of housing. See Ellickson, The Irony of "nclusionary" Zoning,
54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167, 1188 (1981); Siegan, Regulating the Use of Land, in THE INTERACTION OF
ECONOMICS AND LAW 159, 162-63 (B. Siegan ed. 1977); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583(4)
(West Supp. 1983) (requiring local plans to include analysis of the "governmental constraints" on
housing, including those imposed by land use regulation). In response to this argument, the Cali-
fornia legislature in 1981 passed a bill to establish five areas free of local land use controls, ostensi-
bly to permit the development of low- and moderate-income housing without the impediments of
local regulation. The bill was vetoed, however, amidst rumors of undue influence by a developer
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there is considerable academic interest in proposals to reform local
land use and control small changes by structuring regulations to copy a
hypothesized market model of private transactions; but these proposals
have not had great practical impact to date, perhaps because they
would require a forbidding array of changes in current land use regula-
tory practice. 16
How, then, to satisfy critics' charges that local governments make
piecemeal changes unfairly and carelessly? The courts, urged on by
academic commentators, have developed one much-discussed reform
model to control these changes, which I call "plan jurisprudence." The
model first postulates that some form of plan is necessary. Then, draw-
ing heavily on administrative law doctrines, it regards all piecemeal
changes as "judicial" or "quasi-judicial." According to this model,
then, piecemeal land use decisions must conform to standards set out in
preexisting plans; moreover, because the individual decision applies a
general standard to a specific instance, the decision is to be made ac-
cording to adjudicative procedures.
As we shall see, plan jurisprudence has generated much discus-
sion-particularly of its leading case, Fasano v. Board of County Com-
missioners'7-but its actual influence has been limited. In some
who expected to gain from it. See Wiegard, Governor Vetoes 'New Cities' Bill, San Francisco
Chron., Oct. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Wiegard, Brown's Dilemma on New Cities,'id, Sept. 30, 1981, at
8, col. 1.
16. The best known is Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973), which proposes a substitution of local
"nuisance boards" for the present apparatus of zoning. Kmiec's "deregulation," described at
supra note 15, is best seen as a market-mimicking proposal. Nelson proposes creation of a new
market: he would recognize land use controls as a collective neighborhood property right and
permit purchase and sale of such rights. R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 173passim
(1977). See also Nelson, supra note 15.
The reform proposals in land use show a remarkable similarity to those in administrative law.
See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667
(1975). Thus, the Quiet Revolution corresponds to reform proposals that Stewart describes as
revived "nondelegation doctrines," in that they impose greater central control through increased
detail in authorizing statutes. Id at 1693-97. State environmental impact requirements corre-
spond to Stewart's "interest representation," which brings a wider range of interest groups into the
regulatory process to counteract capture of an agency by regulated groups. Id. at 1723. See gener-
ally id at 1711-800. "Deregulation" and "market-mimicking" proposals in land use reflect exten-
sive corresponding proposals in administrative law. Id. at 1689-93, 1702-11. Much of this Article
will deal with the doctrine requiring local governments to conform their land decisions to preexist-
ing plans. This too has an analogue in administrative law reform proposals for "structuring"
discretion through the prior adoption of rules and plans. See id. at 1698-702.
17. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). For commentary, see, for example, Freilich, Fasano v.
Board of County Commissioners of Washington County: Is Rezoning an Administrative or Legisla-
tive Function?, 6 URa. LAW. vii (1974); Mandelker & Netter, Comprehensive Plans and the Law, in
LAND USE LAW: ISSUES FOR THE EIGHTIES 55, 56 (E. Netter ed. 1981); Sullivan, supra note 5;
Sullivan & Kressel, Twenty Years After: Renewed Signficance of the Comprehensive Plan Require-
ment, 9 URB. L. ANN. 33, 48-52 (1975); Webster, The Fasano Procedures. Is Due Process
Enough?, 6 ENVTL. L. 139 (1975); Comment, Developments in the Lag-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. Rev.
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jurisdictions it has been adopted completely;' 8 in others, it has been
ultimately applied only in certain forms of piecemeal changes;' 9 in still
1427, 1547-49 (1978). For authorities recognizing Fasano as a leading case in a discretion-struc-
turing approach to land decisions, see, for example, R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 6,
at 78; MINIMIZING THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION, supra note 6, at 14-20 (1979); C. WEAVER
& R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FUTURE FRONTIER 271 (1979); Curtin & Shirk,
Land Use, Planning and Zoning, 9 URB. LAW. 724, 739 (1977); Kolis, Zoning Amendmentsr. Legis-
lative vs. Quasi-JudicialHearings, URB. LAND, July-Aug. 1979, at 24. Several cases before Fasano,
however, also saw zoning amendments as quasi-judicial. See City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470
S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966);
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
18. Oregon's legislature has now incorporated the Fasano plan jurisprudence approach into
its land use enabling statutes. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 227.160-.180 (1981). Kansas adopted the
Fasano approach to zoning amendments in Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584
P.2d 130 (1978). Kentucky courts adopted a quasi-judicial approach to some zoning changes even
before Fasano. See City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971). Washington
courts have taken the same line, see Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 852, 613 P.2d 1148,
1153 (1980); Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 460-61, 573 P.2d 359, 363 (1978) (citing
Fasano), but are somewhat less stringent about the plan as a standard, see Barrie, 93 Wash. 2d at
850, 613 P.2d at 1152. See also Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. District of Columbia Zoning
Comm'n, 402 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C. 1979) (rezoning decision must be supported by substantial evi-
dence); Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Hawaii 538, 546-48, 524 P.2d 84, 89-91 (1974) (rezoning
decision is quasi-judicial action under state administrative procedure act).
19. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr.
904 (1980) (reversing lower court opinion which cited Fasano in holding rezonings-here by initi-
ative-to be "quasi-judicial"); see also Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App.
3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977). The California courts, however, have held other piecemeal
changes to be quasi-judicial. Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 718 (1979) (subdivision approvals); Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 58 Cal.
App. 3d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1976) (coastal zone development permit); City of Fairfield v.
Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 537 P.2d 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1975) (planned unit develop-
ment); Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d
12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974) (en banc) (variance). See generally Mountain Defense League v.
Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal. App. 3d 723, 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (1977) (decision is quasi-
judicial when it determines specific rights under existing law based on specific facts).
The Michigan Supreme Court briefly adopted the quasi-judicial approach to piecemeal re-
zoning amendments, but changed its mind in Kirk v. Township of Tyrone, 398 Mich. 429, 247
N.W.2d 848 (1976) (discussing earlier cases). Judge Levin led the effort to quasi-judicialize such
decisions; he approved judicial proceedings to determine the reasonableness of proposed changes,
but rejected plan consistency as a standard. See Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. 531, 232
N.W.2d 584 (1975); Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 164, 215 N.W.2d 179, 190
(1974) (Levin, J., concurring); see also Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative
or Quasi-JudicialAct: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1344 (1975);
Cunningham, Reections on Stare Decisis in Michigan: The Rise and Fall of the "Rezoning as
Administrative Act"Doctrine, 75 MICH. L. REv. 983, 985-87 (1977). For the most recent argument
in the Michigan court on this subject, see Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 406 Mich. 137,
277 N.W.2d 475 (1979) (rejecting quasi-judicial approach).
The Colorado Supreme Court also adopted the Fasano approach to rezonings in Snyder v.
City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975), but has backed away from it insofar as it
would remove rezonings from "legislation" subject to referenda. See Margolis v. District Court,
638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981). See also Kelly, Comment on Margolis, Wright, Young, LAND UsE L. &
ZONING DiG., Mar. 1982, at 14.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. City of Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 1978)
has also rejected the Fasano approach (by name) for rezoning amendments, but adopts a quasi-
judicial approach for other piecemeal changes. In Rochester, the court distinguished "special use
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others, it has been rejected entirely.2" Newer statutes have been simi-
larly mixed: the American Law Institute's Model Land Development
Code calls for the quasi-judicialization of piecemeal changes, but is
ambiguous as to plan conformity.2 On the other hand, some new state
statutes mandate planning and "consistency" of land regulations with
plans, but are silent as to the quasi-judicial character of individual
decisions.22
These hesitations about plan jurisprudence suggest it may have
both practical and theoretical defects, and that it may not ensure that
local land use decisions are fair and careful. In this Article I will argue
that plan jurisprudence fails to solve the problems it sets out to meet,
and instead creates new ones, particularly by its advocacy of an outmo-
ded version of local land planning. We need some other approach to
test the reasonableness of these decisions.
My thesis is that piecemeal local land decisions should not be
classed as either "legislative" or "judicial"; these rubrics are drawn
from a separation-of-powers doctrine more appropriate to larger gov-
ernmental units. Piecemeal changes are quintessentially local matters,
and any jurisprudential test of the reasonableness of piecemeal changes
must identify and build upon the factors that lend legitimacy and insti-
tutional competence to local decisionmaking. In this Article I under-
take that task. I will begin by analyzing plan jurisprudence, so as to
point out its flaws and to draw on its merits. In Part I, I discuss the
assertion of judicial control over piecemeal changes, especially in plan
jurisprudence's ideal type, Fasano, and then explore The Federalist No.
10 as a doctrinal background for Fasano's underlying suspicion of the
validity of local land decisions. I will then trace the specific develop-
ment of plan jurisprudence from some specialized issues in zoning in
the 1950's and 1960's, issues that crystallized Federalist-type objections
to local decisionmaking by illuminating certain problems of fairness
and due consideration in local land decisions.
permits," which are quasi-judicial under the rule of Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167
N.W.2d 45 (1969), and rejected the plaintiffs argument that rezoning amendments and special use
permits were functional equivalents. 268 N.W.2d at 888-89. More tentatively, Texas also regards
rezoning amendments as legislative, but sees variances and special exceptions as "perhaps quasi-
judicial" administrative acts. See Board of Adjustment v. Leon, 621 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981). Cf. Harris, Rezoning--Should It Be a Legislative or Judicial Function?, 31 BAYLOR L.
Rv. 409 (1979) (urging that Texas courts should follow Fasano and treat rezonings as adjudica-
tive functions).
20. See, e.g., Hall Paving Co. v. Hall County, 237 Ga. 14,226 S.E.2d 728 (1976) (per curiam)
(rezoning ordinances require no findings of facts or conclusions). For the Minnesota view, see
supra note 19.
21. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE §§ 2-201(3), 2-304 & note, 2-312(2), (3), 3-101 & note 2 (1975).
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3167 (mandatory planning), 163.3194 (consistency)
(West Supp. 1983). For a review of mandatory planning and consistency statutes and decisions
thereunder, see Mandelker & Netter, supra note 17.
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In Part II, I will analyze in detail plan jurisprudence as a solution
to those problems of fairness and due consideration, and will conclude
that it is seriously flawed both in its procedural characterization of local
land decisionmaking as quasi-judicial, and in its substantive reliance
on the plan as a standard.
Then, in Part III, I will attempt to salvage the chief merit of plan
jurisprudence, its recognition that we need a theory to legitimize local
decisionmaking, particularly when the locality decides what are essen-
tially conflicting property claims. In this Part, I outline a non-Federal-
ist tradition that identifies the peculiarly local claim to legitimacy in
two factors that the economist Albert Hirschman calls "voice" and
"exit": the opportunity to participate, or to go elsewhere.13 I will go on
to analyze local piecemeal changes as mediations of property disputes.
In Part IV, I will use these ideas-as well as those of other land use
reform proposals-to develop an alternative jurisprudence of piece-
meal changes. This jurisprudence treats piecemeal changes as dispute
mediations, and tests fairness and due consideration in the light of the
local opportunity for participation or departure. I attempt to develop
standards that refine the processes local governments actually use, that
encourage the use of up-to-date planning techniques, and that gener-
ally heighten the institutional competence of these local decisions.24
Finally, in the Conclusion I comment on why land use decisions have
invariably been committed to local governments.
As may already be obvious, this Article makes several presump-
tions. First, I presume that the jurisprudence of land decisions is
bound to fail unless it takes account of how these decisions are actually
made. Given the constitutionality of local land use controls, 5 and the
likelihood of their continued and even expanded use,26 such a jurispru-
dence should attempt to clarify and refine actual practice. This in turn
suggests not only an inquiry into local institutional legitimacy, but also
a direct approach to the "dealing" characteristics of local land controls.
Second, I presume that a jurisprudence of local land controls should
not distort modern thinking about land planning, but should rather in-
corporate and encourage innovative planning and land regulation.
And finally, I presume that such a jurisprudence should not unnecessa-
rily disrupt the existing judicial interpretations of piecemeal change,
but should rather build on their insights about this form of resolving
disputes. Hence I frame my proposals as a new version of the "reason-
23. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
24. See Freedman, supra note 3.
25. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926).
26. Mandelker & Netter, supra note 17.
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ableness" standard of review, one that will genuinely promote fairness
and care in local decisions.
Taking this conservative approach, I turn to plan jurisprudence as
the current leading candidate for reform of piecemeal changes.
I
PLAN JURISPRUDENCE AS REFORM
A. The Assertion of Judicial Control Over Piecemeal Changes
Piecemeal changes in land use worry critics because they are hard
to control. This Part looks at two ways in which plan jurisprudence
seeks to control small changes. First, it examines judicial enforcement
of conformity to a plan. It then takes a historical look at how the plan
itself became favored as a way of solving problems of fairness and due
consideration.
L Traditional Planning Law and Plan Jurisprudence
In administrative law, one well-known postulate is that adminis-
trative agencies, though they may retain wide discretion, should delimit
that discretion, operating according to rules that they make for them-
selves.27 An analogous view in land use law is that local governments
should first set out a general land use plan, and then apply the plan's
standards as they enact specific land use controls.28
The planning idea is not new, although it has only recently been
taken seriously. In fact, the preference for "structured" land decisions
harks back to one of the oldest methods of assuring both fairness and
due consideration in local land use regulation. The Department of
Commerce's Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), first published in
1922 and adopted by most states over the next few years,29 required
that local land use controls be "in accordance with" a general plan. °
This plan presumably would be created by the local planning commis-
sion, whose impartiality and technical expertise would ensure the dura-
27. See, e.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1969); Hornsby v. Allen,
326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964); see also K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.00
(Supp. 1976); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 52-55 (1971).
28. See Bross, Circling the Squares of Euclidean Zoning: Zoning Predestination and Planning
Free Will, 6 ENVTL. L. 97, 115 (1975), for a comparison of planning requirements with "rule
refinement" doctrine in administrative law.
29. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev. ed. 1926)
[hereinafter cited as SZEA], reprinted in MODEL LAND DEV. CODE app. A at 210-21 (Tent. Draft
Nq. 1, 1968); STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928), re-
printed in MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, supra, app. B at 222-7 1. By the mid-1920's more than half
the states had adopted it in whole or in part; by the early 1970's, all but three had. Baker, supra
note 1, at 170. See Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U.
PA. L. REv. 1029, 1041 (1972). See also R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, supra note 12, at 42-43.
30. SZEA, supra note 29, § 3. See also Sullivan & Kressel, supra note 17, at 36-47.
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bility and rationality of the overall plan.3' The plan, in turn, would
ensure the rationality and stability of the ordinances that implemented
it. It was widely assumed that localities could indeed set their goals far
in advance, that changes in land regulation would therefore seldom be
necessary, and that citizens would not face fluctuations in the status of
their own or their neighbors' land. 2
But both in law and in practice these assumptions proved false.
The courts did little to establish advance planning as a legal prerequi-
site for local land regulation. They noted that the Standard Planning
Enabling Act was issued several years after the SZEA, that it had been
much less widely adopted, and concluded that state legislatures adopt-
ing the SZEA could not have meant to require an independent plan as
a prerequisite to local zoning.33 Following the example of the leading
Supreme Court case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , courts
regarded the zoning ordinances (and their amendments) as "legisla-
tive" acts, which were to be upheld unless they were clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable.
The idea of a plan as an independent control on local regulation
only began to take hold in the 1950's, when federal urban aid programs
began to require (and fund) local planning as a condition to grants-in-
aid.3 5 Even then, the courts were-reluctant to require a plan as a pre-
requisite to actual regulation; well into the 1950's they routinely upheld
zoning ordinances and amendments which disclosed some "plan" in
themselves.3 6
Experience also quickly confounded any expectation that stable
regulations would flow automatically from well-considered long-term
plans. Controls soon became ad hoc responses to individual develop-
ment proposals.37 Local officials encouraged this pattern by zoning ar-
eas for uses less intense than those expected, then altering regulations
on a parcel-by-parcel basis-sometimes after striking a bargain with
the individual developer.38 The real estate industry understood this
31. M. Scorr, supra note 2, at 245.
32. See Heyman, supra note 6, at 184.
33. For a discussion of this pattern, see Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,"
68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1157 (1955). See also Sullivan, supra note 5, at 362-64. Cf. SZEA, supra
note 29.
34. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
35. Sullivan & Kressel, supra note 17, at 36 n.15, 47.
36. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 5.04, at 266-68 (1976); authorities cited id A
leading case is Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957) (ordinance
struck down on other grounds).
37. D. MANDELKER, supra note 5, at 103-04; R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 6, at
58-59; see also Heyman, LegalAssaults on Municipal Land Use Regulation, 5 URtB. L. 1, 2 (1973).
38. MODEL LAND DaV. CODE § 3-106 note, at 70-73 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968); id art. 8
commentary, at 196-97; R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 6, at 58-59.
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process well, and frequently conditioned land purchases on changes in
existing zoning.: 9
As this pattern of land regulation through piecemeal changes be-
came uncomfortably obvious, the idea of a plan to guide actual land
decisions took on renewed force. Within the last decade, -a number of
states have begun to sharpen the older SZEA requirements by adopting
mandatory planning statutes, and by requiring that local land use con-
trols be "consistent" with local plans.4' These new planning statutes
generally require local governments to plan, and may even prescribe
"elements" or subjects about which the local governments must have
plans, but they set no substantive criteria against which to test the local
plan.4 t
Even procedurally, they are general: they require each community
to consider its own locally defined goals, and then to state those goals
in such a way as to direct future decisions. Beyond this, the mandatory
planning and the planning consistency statutes prescribe no particular
procedure that the local government must follow.
It was the courts, rather than the legislatures, that first took a fur-
ther procedural step and judicialized local land use regulations. That
is, instead of seeing small changes as legislative acts that are judicially
reviewable only for arbitrariness, courts began to say that in making
changes, local governmental bodies were acting in judicial or quasi-
judicial capacities.42
39. This pattern appears frequently in the reported cases. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd., v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976);
Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Manley v. City
of Maysville, 528 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1975).
40. Sullivan & Kressel, supra note 17, at 53-63; DiMento, Improving Development Control
Through Planning The Consistency Doctrine, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 n.6 (1978); Hicks, New
and Significant Decisions: The Interest Groups Involved in the Planning and Zoning Process, 1978
INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 1, 13-26. For a breakdown of state statutes on
mandatory planning and consistency, see Mandelker & Netter, supra note 17, at 6-8. See also
Note, Urban Planning and Land Use Regulation: The Needfor Consistency, 14 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 81 (1978). California was among the first states to adopt mandatory planning and consis-
tency legislation. For a discussion of California's consistency requirements, see DiMento, Devel-
oping the Consistency Doctrine: The Contribution ofthe California Courts, 20 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 285 (1980).
41. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. 1983). There are exceptions on specific
subjects. California's mandatory planning statute, for example, requires that the "housing ele-
ment" in local plans meet substantive regional goals for low income housing. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 65583-65584 (West Supp. 1983). The tests of the other elements ask whether the planning
process followed prescribed steps and collected sufficient data. See, e.g., Camp v. Mendocino
County Bd. of Supervisors, 123 Cal. App. 3d 334, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1981). See also Creative
Displays, Inc., v. City of Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Ky. 1980). Tarlock criticizes "consis-
tency" legislation as paying insufficient attention to the content of the plans themselves. Tarlock,
supra note 5, at 84, 99-101.
42. Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978); City of Louisville v.
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2. The Fasano Case
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners4 3 is the leading case in
the quasi-judicialization of local land decisions. I use Fasano and its
Federalist underpinnings to show how and why courts thought they
should enforce conformity to a plan. This 1973 Oregon case involved a
small change: the rezoning of a thirty-two acre parcel to permit mobile
homes. According to the traditional jurisprudence of planning and
zoning, the local council's rezoning ordinance would be cast as a "legis-
lative" act, whatever the size or scope of the parcel rezoned; and as
such it enjoyed a strong presumption of validity." But the Fasano
court, clearly concerned that a local government's unrestrained discre-
tion might lead to sweetheart deals with developers, rejected the tradi-
tional presumption favoring legislative acts. Instead, the court took an
administrative law approach to the local decision, labelling this deci-
sion judicial rather than legislative.
The court's reasoning had two separate strands. The first, and
more developed, concerned the nature of the piecemeal land decision
itself; the second, the character of the decisionmaking body. As to the
nature of the change itself, the Fasano court distinguished individual
parcel rezonings from adoption of general plans or general land use
controls. The latter are broad policy decisions, the court reasoned, and
are properly viewed as legislative; but the former apply preexisting pol-
icy standards--embodied in the general plan itself-to an individual
McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507
P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc).
43. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). For commentary on the development of judicial control
over land use, see authorities cited supra note 17.
44. Such rezonings, as "legislative" ordinances, are presumed to be valid, and are overturned
only if arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Hall Paving Co. v. Hall County, 237 Ga. 14, 226 S.E.2d
728 (1976) (per curiam); Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951); see
also Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968) (planned unit devel-
opment). Implicitly contrary to the presumption of validity, however, was the longstanding (but
theoretically uncertain) restraint on small-scale rezonings as so-called "spot zones." See, e.g.,
Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1961); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862,
120 N.W.2d 270 (1963). See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, §§ 5.08-.19, at 285-384.
Some jurisdictions' courts developed fairly elaborate doctrines to protect residents against changes
in zoning. The most notable example is Maryland. Here the courts have developed a doctrine
whereby localities are required to justify changes in zoning by showing either a substantial change
of condition since the original regulation, or a mistake in the original regulation; these decisions
implicitly alter the presumption of validity of zoning ordinance amendments. See, e.g., Chapman
v. Montgomery County Council, 259 Md. 641, 271 A.2d 156 (1970); MacDonald v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965); Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27
(1953). But see the extensive critique in Barnes' dissenting opinions in MacDonald and Chapman.
For a discussion of the influence of the Maryland change/mistake rule in a number of other
jurisdictions, see Burke, The Change-Mistake Rule and Zoning in Maryland, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 631
(1976). See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 5.07.
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parcel.45 Such rezonings entail the consideration of what administra-
tive law calls "adjudicative facts"-that is, specific details about spe-
cific properties brought forth by specially interested parties; and they
entail the application of standards (i.e., the plan) to the facts
presented.46 According to Fasano, such decisions are judicial rather
than legislative.4 7 Therefore, in making these decisions, the local gov-
ernmental body should operate with at least some of the procedural
trappings of a court: it should act as an impartial tribunal and receive
no ex parte contacts; it should allow the interested parties to present
and rebut evidence; it should make decisions on a record, together with
appropriate findings; judicial review of its decisions should be stricter
than the traditional loose review for mere legislative arbitrariness, and
should instead require substantial evidence to support the decision,
with the burden on the local government to show plan conformity. 8
In concluding that some zoning ordinances were judicial rather
than legislative, the Fasano court also suggested a second strand of rea-
soning, relating to the nature of the local decisionmaking body. The
court rejected the argument that a local government's rezoning decision
was legislative simply because it was undertaken by an elected council,
and remarked that local governing bodies could not be equated with
state or national legislatures.49 Indeed, the court's bold recharacteriza-
tion of the local ordinance depended on seeing the local decisionmak-
ing body not as a full "legislature," but rather as something less. A full
state or national legislature may adopt legislation even on highly indi-
vidualized subjects without special quasi-judicial hearings; these are re-
quired only of "subordinate bodies" such as administrative agencies.5 0
This less developed strand of Fasano-the treatment of a local
governing body as something less than a full legislature-is thus critical
to its functional administrative law analysis of the local government's
land regulations. But the court's discussion of this central issue is re-
markably cryptic as to why a local representative body, at least in some
45. 264 Or. at 582-83, 507 P.2d at 26-27.
46. 1 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958). See also City of Louisville v.
McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 177-78 (Ky. 1971); Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md.
2d 55, 64-65, 217 A.2d 578, 585 (1966).
47. 264 Or. at 581, 507 P.2d at 26.
48. Id at 583-84, 507 P.2d at 29-30.
49. Id at 581, 507 P.2d at 26.
50. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). In Anderson v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 77 Kan. 721, 95 P. 583 (1908), the Supreme Court of Kansas, interpreting Minnesota's
constitutional prohibition against special legislation, observed that when a legislature "acts upon a
public bill, [it] legislates; when it acts upon a private bill, it adjudicates," id at 731, 95 P. at 586
(quoting Orth, SpecialLegislation, 97 ATL. MONTHLY 69, 69 (1906)), but went on to comment on
the prevalence of special legislation in state legislatures in the absence of constitutional limitations
on such bills.
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of its decisions, is not a legislature but is more akin to an administrative
body.5 '
It is all the more important to ask this question because Fasano so
sharply intrudes into the entire structure of local decisionmaking on
land use matters. As I have argued, local governments from the outset
had dealt with land development on a piecemeal, bargaining basis. In
challenging and restructuring this bargaining process, Fasano broke
with a pervasive pattern."
Moreover, Fasano's challenge rests on a troublesome suspicion of
local legislative bodies, 53 and is related to a long line of legal doctrines
that have limited the powers of local government-unduly so, in the
eyes of some commentators.5 4 Let us then pursue that crucial undevel-
oped portion of Fasano: In what way is a local governing body not
fully a legislature?
B. The Federalist No. 10 and Local Land Decisions
One reason that a local representative body is not a legislature is
the mere fact of its subordination to a state government. Municipali-
ties, after all, are creatures of the state rather than independent "sover-
eigns."55  But this answer is too easy. Fasano may have cited
administrative law cases, but local governments are not merely admin-
istrative bodies that fill in the interstices of statutes passed by state leg-
islatures, or that carry out preestablished state policies. Rather, they
exercise wide police powers within their jurisdictions, at least insofar as
state legislation is not preemptive. Indeed, many state constitutions
guarantee the local powers of home rule against state legislative incur-
sions.5 6 Moreover, local governing councils, like larger legislatures, are
composed of elected representatives for fixed terms of office. Why,
then, even despite subordination to state government, are local govern-
ments not "legislative" bodies?
As one pair of administrative law authors has said, the American
51. Anderson comments on other courts' failures to explain the "administrative" treatment
of local governments' land use decisions, relating the failure to suspicion of local governments. 4
R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 25.06, at 210. See also MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs,
238 Md. 549, 586-88, 210 A.2d 325, 346-47 (1965) (Barnes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "adminis-
trative" characterization of a local governing body).
52. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
53. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 25.05, at 208-10.
54. See generally Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
55. See generally 1 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1.38, 2.08a
(3d rev. ed. 1971). In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50-51
(1982), the Supreme Court recently reemphasized that localities are not "sovereign."
56. 2 E. MCQUILLAN, SUpra note 55, § 9.08. See generally Vanlandingham, Munipalflome
Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968). For a discussion of home rule
authorization of local land use control, see R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, §§ 2.14-.18.
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understanding of governance through separate branches was "devel-
oped by Locke and Montesquieu and refined by Madison. 57
Madison's chief refinement has to do precisely with the legislature, and
with the qualities that make a legislature's decisions fair and reliable.
His celebrated The Federalist No. 10 merits study here, for it suggests
why a local elected government should not always be seen as a
legislature.
Madison's essay begins with the argument that the chief obstacle
to fairness in a legislative body is "faction": the tendency of one inter-
est group to impose its will at the expense of others.5" The antidote to
faction, Madison says, lies in a constituency of sufficient size and vari-
ety; The Federalist No. 10 argued that the great advantage of the "ex-
tended republic" (i.e., the proposed national government) was that it
would contain such a variety of interests that no one "faction" could
tyrannize the others.5 9 Where the constituency is large, action is possi-
ble only through persuasion and coalitions of interest groups. Through
a pattern of shifting alliances and vote trading, every interest can ob-
tain at least partial satisfaction in the legislature of the "extended
republic."60
That all of the participating parties can expect some satisfaction of
at least some of their desires is one assurance of fairness in legislation.
Fairness is also advanced by the conditions that attend coalition-build-
ing itself: no interest group can safely go for the jugular of another,
because all know that they may need to call on each other in different
coalitions. Thus the very expectations built into the coalition-building
process impose a modicum of mutual forbearance on the various inter-
est groups.6'
Hannah Pitkin, in her analysis of The Federalist No. 10, has
stressed a second characteristic of its legislature, one that assures due
consideration of the public interest: the clash of multiple interests pre-
57. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 37 (1979).
See also D. WALKER, TOWARD A FUNCTIONING FEDERALISM 23-43, 227-28 (1981).
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-57 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see also ld No. 51, at
351-53.
59. Id No. 10, at 63-65; see also id No. 51, at 351-53.
60. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 37 (1970); Michelman,
Political Markets and Community Self-Determinatiom Competing Judicial Models ofLocal Govern-
ment Efficiency, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 173 (1977-78). For a practical example, see S. HAYS, CONSERVA-
TION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 231-40 (1980) (tracing passage of the Rivers and Harbors
Act). But see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 80-88 (1980) (Madisonian pluralist coalition-
building model may not always protect minority interests, even at the federal level). See also J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 131-45 (1962) (coalition-building model of legislative action leads to inef-
ficient over-regulation or over-taxation so long as minority voters are not compensated by winning
coalitions).
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-64 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); id. No. 51, at 352-53.
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vents hasty and ill-considered decisions and forces the legislators to
take the time to reflect on the true public welfare. 62 Because of these
factors, then, the courts can safely trust the larger legislature to make
fair and careful decisions under most circumstances, and can give
broad leeway to those decisions.
But this justification of large legislatures' decisions contains an im-
plicit criticism of small-scale government: A legislative body drawn
from too small or too homogeneous a constituency may be dominated
by a single interest or faction.63 Factional domination may take vary-
ing forms. One is sheer corruption, made possible in smaller represen-
tative bodies because a limited number of persons have influence which
must be bought.' Another possibility is domination by a few who are
perceived by others as the powerful. The decisions of these few can
affect many within the community; others must curry their favor, and
even larger interests find difficulty in organizing against their "ca-
bals.''65 Finally, and perhaps most feared by Madison, is the factional
domination created by a popular "passion7-sometimes a sudden
whim, sometimes a longstanding prejudice-that carries a majority
before it.66 Under any of these various forms of factional domination,
all of which are far more likely to occur in a smaller legislature than in
a larger one, a dominant group may subject others to sudden destruc-
tion or to permanent political disability.
In a small-scale government, then, there may be no clash of multi-
ple interests leading to at least temporary stasis and ultimately to an
62. H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 195-96 (1967).
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61-63 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
64. For a discussion of local corruption in land use regulation, see MINIMIZING THE INCEN-
TIVES FOR CORRUPTION, supra note 6, at 1-13; see also NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRUPTION IN LAND USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1979); Nelson,
supra note 15, at 724 (1979); Shapiro, The Casefor Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMPLE L.Q. 267, 282-
83 (1968). Cf. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 405-10 ("influence" stronger in larger governments).
Ellickson uses The Federalist as a basis for this argument, although it appears to contradict The
Federalist's comments about the greater opportunities for corruption in smaller governments. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-64 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also 2 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 256-57 (J.
Elliot ed. 1836) (Hamilton's comments on corruption in small-scale government in his remarks at
the New York ratifying convention) [hereinafter cited as Elliot].
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62-64 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); 2 Elliot, supra note
64, at 256-57 (Hamilton speech). For a discussion of faction in the contemporary British Parlia-
ment and its influence on American thinkers, see B. BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLI-
TICS 124-26 (1967). The danger of influence, or in 18th-century parlance "cabal," in local
government is highlighted in Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596,
1598-99 (1965). On the organizational problems of large groups vis-a-vis small groups, see M.
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 28-29, 46-48, 53-57 (1965).
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58-62 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also Frug, supra
note 54, at 1072.
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adequate and careful consideration of the public well-being. 67 More-
over, as Frank Michelman has recently suggested, there may not be
enough items of political interest to permit the development of coali-
tions and the benefit-trading and mutual forbearance they entail. 8
Thus, a local representative council cannot (or cannot always) be
trusted to act with the "legislative due process" envisioned by The Fed-
eralist No. 10 in a larger legislature.
In a nation whose view of legislative legitimacy is so heavily influ-
enced by Madison's arguments,69 local governments may thus always
be viewed with some bemusement or even suspicion.70 Indeed, several
authors in recent years have argued, on Federalist considerations, that
no local decisions are fully legislative (and hence presumptively valid)
for purposes of judicial review. Because of the lack of multiple inter-
ests at the local level, these authors say, the internal structure of local
government fails to assure a sufficient regard for the interests of local
minorities, whose support need never be sought by the stable local
majorities.7'
However much or little local governments may structurally resem-
ble the Federalist legislature in general, they are very unlikely to be
restrained by the Federalist safeguards in making specific piecemeal
land decisions. In making these decisions, which involve only a few
interested parties meeting only on single issues, legislatures are re-
strained neither by a coalition-building process that assures the fairness
of the decisions, nor by a clash of interests that gives time for sober
consideration. Courts should therefore not assume that these safe-
guards have worked. If these decisions are to be found reasonable, the
finding requires some alternative source of fairness and due
consideration.
It seems, then, that any model suggesting that local governments
are just like larger legislative bodies is unrealistic. It follows that courts
should not give local governments' ad hoc land decisions the deference
they accord to measures taken by state legislatures. Fasano's plan ju-
67. H. PITKIN, supra note 62, at 195-96.
68. Michelman, supra note 60, at 173-77. Not only is coalition-building in many local gov-
ernments limited by the relatively small size of the local constituency, but in many areas special
purpose districts even further reduce the range of issues on which coalitions can be formed in the
local governmental process. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICA (1964).
69. D. WALKER, supra -note 57, at 36-43, 227-28.
70. For a discussion of the longstanding suspicion of local government in America, see Frug,
supra note 54, at 1067, 1106-12; see also J. ELY, supra note 60, at 80. For the same discussion in
the context of local land regulation, see 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 25.05.
71. Sandalow, The Limits of Municpal Power Under Home Rule.- A Role for the Courts, 48
MINN. L. REV. 643, 709-11 (1964); Waggoner, Log-rolling and Judicial Review, 52 U. COLO. L.
REv. 33, 43 (1980); Note, supra note 65, at 1597-99.
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risprudence attempts to solve the problem by agreeing that the local
government is not a true legislature; rather, it is more like a court, and
its decisions should therefore be made according to judicial standards.
The substantive standards for these adjudicative decisions derive from
the locality's own plan; the procedures derive from the courts.
But the skittishness of some jurisdictions about Fasano72 suggests
that some courts find that quasi-judicialization is also inappropriate for
controlling at least some piecemeal changes, and that we should seek
alternatives to plan jurisprudence. This Article will argue that the bet-
ter approach is to abandon analogies to the separate branches, and to
fashion tests of fairness and due consideration that are based directly
on the "dealing" character of piecemeal changes. Before arguing this
thesis, however, I shall examine the history of the recent revival of the
plan as a device to structure and test local land use discretion, for that
history clarifies the precise nature of the problems that modern plan
jurisprudence attempts to address.
C. A Historical Excursion into Plan Jurisprudence.-
Of Variances and Referenda
Although the civil rights and environmental movements, pointing
as they did to unfairness toward outsiders in the local land use regula-
tion process, undoubtedly had some role in reviving the idea of a gen-
eral plan, it was the internal problems in local administration that
provoked the criticism and analysis ultimately reflected in plan juris-
prudence. Among these problems, the most prominent were the notori-
ously leaky variance process and the worrisome questions surrounding
referenda on land use decisions. The next two Subsections trace the
history of the issues involved in controlling variances and referenda.
1. Variances and the Quasi-Judicialization of Land Use Decisions
In the early SZEA model of land use control, the variance process
allowed exceptions from general zoning regulations where, due to spe-
cial circumstances, the owner of a particular property would suffer spe-
cial hardship by the strict application of the general ordinance, and
where relaxing the regulation would not be "contrary to the public in-
terest."73 In such hardship cases, the possibility of getting a variance
allayed charges that the general ordinance was an unconstitutional
"taking" of property.
74
Even in the early years of zoning, however, one of the leaders of
72. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
73. SZEA, supra note 29, § 7.
74. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 17.11. See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928).
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the city planning movement complained that variance boards granted
variances simply when they thought no harm would be done. 75 During
the mid-1950's and 1960's, academic studies of the variance process
confirmed this pattern: Zoning adjustment boards granted variances in
a seemingly haphazard fashion, disregarding both the statutory stan-
dards of special hardship or unique circumstances and such procedural
niceties as notice to interested parties, establishment of a record, and
statements of findings.76
A chief complaint about the variance proceeding was that it could
eviscerate a zoning ordinance and any plan on which the ordinance
was based. Easy variances made cities' plans the victims of importun-
ing land developers.77 One Chicago study in the 1950's noted that the
city's board of adjustment approved the vast majority of variance ap-
plications with very little attention to the views of the professional
planners.78 Later studies in Philadelphia79 and Alameda County, Cali-
fornia80 came to the same conclusion. A Kentucky study remarked
that one group of applicants-would-be gas station operators-viewed
variances more or less as a matter of right.8' The only Band-Aid on the
variance hemorrhage was the possibility that the neighbors might com-
plain: contested variances were granted considerably less often than
uncontested ones.82 But to the critics, this fact only highlighted the
political and arbitrary character of the variance process and how it en-
gendered disrespect for law.8 3
While some commentators attributed the variance flood to the ri-
75. E. BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATION AND COURT DECISIONS DURING
THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 142 (2d ed. 1940). See also Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals-
Villain or Victim?, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 353, 378 (1962).
76. Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board ofAdjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50
Ky. LJ. 273 (1962); Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations, and Neighborhood Decline in
Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 470,480 (1953); see also Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Resi-
dentialDevelopments, 73 HARv. L. REV. 241, 252 (1959). For a discussion of the related problem
of "special exceptions" granting discretionary permits to churches, see Note, Churches and Zoning,
70 HARV. L. REV. 1428, 1432-34 (1957).
77. Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 76, at 337-39; Reps, Discretionary Powers of the
Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 280, 281-82 (1955); Comment, supra note
76, at 476; see also Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, I I Cal. 3d
506, 518, 522 P.2d 12, 19, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 843 (1974); Comment, Judicial Control over Zoning
Boards of Appeal- Suggestionsfor Rleform, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 937, 951 (1965).
78. Comment, supra note 76, at 480.
79. See Note, Zoning--Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 516, 541-42 (1955) (planners' views virtually ignored as factor in study of zoning
variances).
80. Comment, Zoning: Variance Administration in Alameda County, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 101,
108 (1962).
81. Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 76, at 298.
82. Id at 328-29; Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARV. L. REV. 668, 675
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Administrative Discretion]; Note, supra note 79, at 541-42.
83. Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U. CmI. L. REV. 509,
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gidity of the general zoning ordinances, 84 they also proposed a nar-
rower solution to the variance problem: variance boards should be
held to the procedures of "quasi-judicial" or "administrative" bodies-
terms that were often used interchangeably."5 The position had several
arguments in its favor. First, the SZEA required minutes in variance
proceedings and allowed decisions to be appealed to a court; 6 this im-
plied that a board's record should at least be sufficient for a court to
review. 7 Second, board members were usually appointed and had du-
ties comparable to those of administrative officers-applying the statu-
tory standards of hardship and unique circumstances to individual
cases.88 Finally, and perhaps most important, quasi-judicial proce-
dures might counterbalance zoning boards' tendency to be, as one court
delicately put it, "insufficiently insulated" from developers seeking
variances.' 9
There were, however, certain problems with this characterization
of the variance board's duties. "Unnecessary hardship" and "special
circumstances" scarcely seemed to be matters calling for special admin-
istrative expertise,90 and the criterion "not contrary to the public inter-
est" seemed even less to be a standard applied quasi-judicially. Indeed,
in the 1930's, courts in Illinois" and Maryland92 had overturned gen-
eral variance authorization as an overbroad delegation of legislative
538 (1959); Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 76, at 274-75, 303; Comment, supra note 76, at
482-83.
84. See, e.g., Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 76, at 350; see also Note, Administrative
Discretion, supra note 82, at 680, 683. But see Comment, supra note 76, at 474.
85. Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 76, at 349-50; Reps, supra note 77, at 294-96; see
also Babcock, supra note 83, at 538-39. Cf. Bryden, supra note 10, at 316-17 (proposing abolition
of use variances, leaving aggrieved owners to a judicial remedy in the ordinary courts). For a
discussion of the interchangeable use of the designations "administrative" and "quasi-judicial,"
see E. BAssErTsupra note 75, at 131. Cf. Commentsupra note 77, at 940-41; Note,Administrative
Discretion, supra note 82, at 684.
86. SZEA, supra note 29, § 7. This section required minutes of proceedings, records of ex-
aminations, and records of votes, but did not require findings or conclusions. Reviewing courts
were entitled to take additional evidence, suggesting de novo proceedings rather than review of a
quasi-judicial proceeding by the variance board.
87. Krasnowiecki, supra note 29, at 1040. But see Dukeminier & Stapleton, supra note 76, at
322 (referring to the variance board decision as quasi-judicial); id. at 330-35 (arguing that findings
of fact and statements of reasons were less important for judicial review than for forcing local
decisionmakers to develop reliable and impartial procedures). For a similar view, see Comment,
supra note 77, at 947, 952-53.
88. E. BAssnrr, supra note 75, at 121-22; Comment, supra note 80, at 101; f. Babcock, supra
note 83, at 512.
89. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 518,
522 P.2d 12, 19, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 843 (1974).
90. Note, Administrative Discretion, supra note 82, at 672, 675; Comment, supra note 77, at
946-47.
91. Welton v. Hamilton, 344 111. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931).
92. Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist Protestant Church, 164 Md. 487, 165 A. 703 (1933).
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power.93
The vagueness of the variance criteria, and the lay status of the
variance boards94 suggest that these boards were less expert administra-
tors than representative groups of concerned but fair-minded citizens,
compromising and smoothing conflicts among neighbors.9 The
boards' own activities certainly suggested that they saw their duties as
being akin to a mediating forum for development requests and neigh-
bors' protests. They attempted to take into account genuinely inter-
ested objections, they granted requests where no such objections
appeared 96 or where the grant accorded with other uses in the vicin-
ity,97 and they often mollified objectors by making conditional grants.9"
Their real flaw, on this "mediation" view, was their frequent failure to
notify and grant a hearing to potential objectors.
If this view of board-as-mediator had prevailed, we might have
seen a very different jurisprudence of local land use matters. But it did
not. By the 1960's the general wisdom held that in order both to pre-
serve an overall zoning scheme and to protect the parties immediately
interested, variances should be guided through procedures more rigor-
ous than developer pressure as tempered by neighborhood uproar. Ad-
ministrative law models suggested an analogy of the variance to quasi-
judicial procedures, and perhaps it is not surprising that the courts
grasped the analogy, at least to the extent of requiring records and find-
ings that related variance decisions to what were considered the appli-
cable standards. 99 If nothing else, such procedures gave the courts a
stable point of departure in reviewing variance proceedings.
Meanwhile, in two celebrated articles in the mid-1950's, Charles
Haar extended the variance criticism to the zoning ordinance itself, ar-
93. Babcock, supra note 83, at 515-19.
94. Anderson, supra note 75, at 358; Comment, supra note 77, at 942.
95. Anderson, supra note 75, at 358. For one case taking a mediative view of boards of
adjustment, see Burger King Corp. v. Amelkin, 70 A.D.2d 627, 416 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1979) (citing
Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 25, 181 N.E.2d 407, 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377
(1962)). Bryden, supra note 10, at 296, noted the lay character of the boards, but thought this
contrary to an earlier notion of variance boards as comprising experts. Id. at 291-92.
96. See supra note 82.
97. Note, supra note 79, at 534, 542. For examples of this practice of zoning boards, see
Morris v. City of Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ky. 1969); Lindburg v. Zoning Bd. of Ap-
peals, 8 IlL. 2d 254, 133 N.E.2d 266 (1956) (board's grant of variance overturned).
98. Babcock, supra note 83, at 536; see generally 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 304.
99. See, e.g., Lindburg v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 8 IlL. 2d 254, 133 N.E.2d 266 (1956); Morris
v. City of Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. 1969); Zinck v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 345 Mass.
394, 187 N.E.2d 665 (1963); Harrington Glen, Inc. v. Municipal Bd. of Adjustment, 52 N.J. 22, 243
A.2d 233 (1968); R-N-R Assocs. v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 100 R.I. 7, 210 A.2d 653 (1965). See
generally Comment, supra note 77, at 940-41. For an influential later case, see Topanga Ass'n for
a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836
(1974). For an interesting comparison, see P. NONEr, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (1969) (tracing
the "legalization" of the California Industrial Accident Commission).
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guing that unless bound to the standards of a preexisting plan, zoning
ordinances too could be passed merely to grant special favors or to ac-
commodate developers' pressures.' ° Haar's articles were the first ma-
jor critiques of the courts' treatment of the relationship between
planning and zoning. Even though the SZEA required that land use
controls be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan," Haar argued,
the courts had vitiated that requirement by viewing it as satisfied if the
zoning ordinance was citywide, or covered a variety of uses, or indeed
was merely "well-considered."'' Haar contended that the plan should
be viewed as a "constitution,"'' 02 and that zoning ordinances should be
judged by their conformity with it.
Some courts began to find Haar's ideas useful in reviewing chal-
lenged zoning ordinances. The difference between variances and small
zoning amendments had always been blurred in practice; localities had
long used the two techniques as more or less interchangeable methods
to arrive at piecemeal changes.' 3 If variances required adherence to
standards and findings, why should amendments be treated differently?
Thus, as in the case of variances, plan conformity offered the courts a
way to structure their review of these rezoning ordinances, particularly
when the neighbors challenged the ordinance on vague public interest
grounds."° From the point of view of the courts, plan conformity
saved them from resting on their own unaided version of the "public
interest," and instead channeled their review along procedural lines.10 5
Moreover, requiring the community to adhere to its own prior plan
seemed to increase fairness to the neighbors, not only by protecting
them against surprise, but also by giving them a starting point for their
legal arguments.
Later commentators, going beyond Haar's view of the plan as a
100. Haar, supra note 33, at 1174; Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 365-66 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Haar, The Master Plan].
101. Haar, supra note 33, at 1170-73.
102. Haar, The Master Plan, supra note 100, at 375; see also Curtin & Shirk, Land Use, Plan-
ning and Zoning, 9 URB. LAW. 724, 725-26 (1977).
103. E. BASSEar, supra note 75, at 144-46; Babcock, supra note 83, at 515-19; Comment, supra
note 80, at 104 n.18.
104. See Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960); Krasnowiecki,
Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 73-77 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Develop-
ment]. See also Krasnowiecki, supra note 29, at 1038 n.29. But see Kozesnik v. Township of
Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 165-66, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (1957) (citing Haar's work to hold that the phrase
"in accordance with a general plan" did not require an independent plan-a strained use of
Haar's articles, in view of his criticism of that position).
105. See Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211,215-17, 164 A.2d 7, 11-12 (1960). As
one observer, Jan Krasnowiecki, astutely remarked, casting the courts' decisions in terms of plan
conformity allowed the courts to call on the planners' expertise. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit De-
velopment, supra note 104, at 67.
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guide to legislation, easily took the next procedural step: If the plan
was the standard for zoning, then individual rezoning ordinances were
not legislative decisions but quasi-judicial applications of the plan, and
the decisionmakers should be held to quasi-judicial procedures. 0 6 The
basic argument these commentators made was that in rezoning individ-
ual parcels, city councils essentially acted as judges, measuring specific
facts against the standards of the plan.
These commentators distinguished individual parcel rezonings
from large-scale citywide rezonings on the basis of the familiar admin-
istrative law distinction between legislative and adjudicative subject
matter: large-scale rezonings involved policy decisions balancing great
multitudes of facts, and were thus appropriate for legislative treatment,
whereas small-scale rezonings involved particular parties and limited
numbers of facts, which should be measured against the preexisting
general policies. 107 Commentators also referred to political considera-
tions suggestive of The Federalist No. 10 to support the distinction:
general rezonings affected large numbers of citizens, who would let
their councilmen know their views and therefore would protect them-
selves through the ordinary political process; but in small-scale rezon-
ings, the number of interested parties was limited, and those among
them with contacts might have grossly disproportionate political influ-
ence.10 8 As in the variance context, there loomed behind the small-
106. In 1966, Richard Babcock took this view in his popular and influential critique of local
land practice, The Zoning Game. R. BABCOCK, supra note 4, at 158. Two years later, the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALI), in its first tentative draft of a new Model Land Redevelopment Code,
strongly suggested that local governing councils, like local variance boards, should be held to
quasi-judicial proceedings in small-scale land decisions. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE §§ 3-106, 8-
104, 8-202 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968). In 1971, Kentucky's highest court, interpreting a new state
planning and zoning enabling statute, found that a local council acted in a quasi-judicial capacity
in making an exception to the statutory requirements for plan conformity; explicitly referring to
administrative law doctrine, the court held that the local council would have to hold a "trial type"
hearing (as opposed to an "argument" hearing) to determine whether the statutory criteria for
relief had been met. City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 177-78 (Ky. 1971). The
next year, an Ohio State Law Journal Comment, perhaps unimportant in itself except for its later
citation in Fasano and other plan jurisprudence cases, maintained this same position. See Com-
ment, Zoning Amendments---the Product of Judicial or Quasi-JudicialAction, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130
(1972). For cases citing the Comment, see Fasano, 264 Or. at 581, 588, 507 P.2d at 26-27, 30;
Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 426, 542 P.2d 371, 376 (1975); Kropf v. City of Ster-
ling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 169 n.5, 215 N.W.2d 179, 192 n.5 (1974) (Levin, J., concurring). See
also Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 406 Mich. 137, 200 n.31, 277 N.W.2d 475, 498 n.31
(1979) (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. Comment, supra note 106, at 137; see also Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292,
299, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972); Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure.- The Com-
plementary Requirements ofDue Process andJudicial Review, 10 GA. L. REv. 753, 776, 780 (1976).
108. Comment, supra note 106, at 132. See also Freilich & Larson, Conflicts of Interest: A
Model Statutory Proposal for the Regulation of Municipal Transactions, 38 UMKC L. REv. 373,
390-98 (1970). Later plan jurisprudence cases continued to stress the possibility that development
interests might have disproportionate influence. See, e.g., Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community
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scale rezoning the specter of the influential developer, from whom the
neighbors needed refuge in a quasi-judicial forum whose decisions met
the standards of the duly considered plan.
Thus by the early 1970's, a perception that localities were yielding
too easily to haphazard development pressures had brought courts and
commentators well along toward plan jurisprudence. Some courts not
only required that local land use decisions conform to an independent
plan, but also recharacterized at least some of the those decisions as
quasi-judicial, not legislative. Apparently, they thought that local leg-
islatures were no stronger than variance boards in standing up to the
factional influence of development pressure. To protect a semblance of
due consideration, as well as the neighbors' interests, they began to
hold the local decisionmakers to another procedural model-i.e., the
quasi-judicial application of a preexisting plan.
2. Referenda and the Problem of Controlling Majoritarian Rule
In the variance context, the developers represented a "factional"
influence of special economic interests. But the voters themselves
sometimes seemed to represent another type of faction-that of popu-
lar prejudice or caprice. Indeed, voter decisions rather than developer
influence generated a second set of worries about local land use admin-
istration: Could zoning changes be made by referenda or even more
troublesome, by initiative? Could the voters reject the city council's
zoning amendments, or, to up the ante, could they come up with zoning
amendments of their own? And if they could do either, what happened
to the idea of zoning according to a general plan?
Questions like these came up when voters threatened to disap-
prove commercial developments or apartment projects approved by
planning commissions and city councils but challenged by referenda.
In the state courts, these questions frequently revolved around the issue
of whether individual zoning amendments were legislative acts setting
general policy, or administrative acts merely executing existing legisla-
tive policy; if the former, then rezonings were subject to voter approval;
if the latter, then only the city council, as executor of existing policy,
could make the decisions.10 9
v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 518, 522 P.2d 12, 19, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 843 (1974);
South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs, 280 Or. 3, 14, 569 P.2d 1063,
1073 (1977).
109. For cases holding that zoning amendments are administrative and thus not subject to
referendum or initiative, see, for example, West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 471-72, 221
N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (1974); Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 323-24, 75 N.W.2d 713, 715-16 (1956);
Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 537-38, 516 P.2d 1234, 1236-37 (1973).
See also City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 207-08, 439 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1968)
(en banc) (statutory approval process required); Olson v. Town of Avon, 143 Conn. 448, 451-54,
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These problems again focused attention on the general plan as the
existing policy to be carried out administratively. As several courts
noted, amendments by popular vote could destroy piecemeal the com-
prehensive and harmonious scheme that zoning was designed to pro-
mote.1° A second issue was the procedural suitability of a popular
vote on an individual's property, where popular emotions were unre-
strained even by ordinary city council processes. The planning com-
mission reports, the public hearings, and the collegial discussion and
decisionmaking were all dispensed with."'
State courts had grappled with these issues for several years when
the United States Supreme Court made two major constitutional deci-
sions upholding local referenda. Both concerned voter objections to
multifamily housing projects. First, in its 1971 decision in James v.
Valtierra, 12 the Court upheld California's requirement that subsidized
low-income housing projects be approved by local referenda. Then, in
its 1976 decision in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,
the Court upheld a local charter ainendment adopted by referendum
after the city council rezoned to permit a multifamily housing project;
the charter amendment required that any future rezoning pass a fifty-
five percent referendum majority. The Ohio Supreme Court had held
that this referendum procedure violated due process requirements,
since a referendum made the rezoning decision "dependent upon the
potentially arbitrary and unreasonable whims of the voting public. '14
But the United States Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Ohio
court had ruled that rezonings were legislative rather than administra-
tive acts.' 15 The local council merely acted for the people in such legis-
123 A.2d 279, 281-82 (1956) (town meeting decision improper); State ex rel Powers v. Donohue,
368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1963) (en banc). But see San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council,
13 Cal. 3d 205, 212-18, 529 P.2d 570, 574-78, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150-54 (1974) (zoning ordinance
is legislative; notice not required in initiative context), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976); Den-
ney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 28, 202 N.W.2d 892, 895-96 (1972) (zoning amendment is
legislative, not administrative).
110. West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 466-69, 221 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (1974); Kelley v.
John, 162 Neb. 319, 321-23, 75 N.W.2d 713, 714-15 (1956); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs &
Mkts., Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 537-38, 516 P.2d 1234, 1236-37 (1973); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 2,
394 P.2d 808, 808 (1964); see also Elliott v. City of Clawson, 21 Mich. App. 363, 376, 175 N.W.2d
821, 828 (1970); Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 525, 312 A.2d 154, 157
(1973); Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 6-7, 277 P.2d 805, 808-09 (1954); Note,
Limitations on Initiative and Referendum, 3 STAN. L. REv. 497, 502-04 (1951).
111. See supra note 110 and authorities cited therein; City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court,
103 Ariz. 204, 207-08, 439 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1968); Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969).
112. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
113. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
114. Forest City Enters., Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 195, 324 N.E.2d 740, 746
(1975).
115. 426 U.S. at 673-74.
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lative acts, the Court reasoned, and the sovereign people could
constitutionally reserve to itself a type of decision that otherwise would
have been made by the local council in its legislative capacity.'
1 6
It might seem that Eastlake leaves to the states the characterization
of local land changes. So viewed, the case might well allow a state to
characterize piecemeal changes as neither legislative nor judicial but as
something else-a point to which I shall return.117 But the Court's dis-
cussion of the "legislative" rubric, together with Justice Stevens' dis-
senting citation of fasano and its 'judicial" characterization of
piecemeal changes,"18 directed the ensuing academic and legal discus-
sion into conventional separation-of-powers channels, where the only
choices among processes are legislative and judicial (or an administra-
tive variant of the latter).
Certainly Valtierra and Eastlake did not settle the controversy
over zoning amendments by popular vote; on the contrary, the deci-
sions only fueled the debate. Academic commentators criticized
Eastlake's "reserved powers" argument, and commented on the proce-
dural due process problems entailed in leaving complex decisions (par-
ticularly on such subjects as public housing) to an overheated populace;
no one could realistically expect that the people at large-as distin-
guished from their city councils-would hold hearings, sift through re-
ports, debate issues, or record their views on the relevant evidence and
appropriate conclusions." 9 Eastlake critics also pointed out that a de-
cision by referendum was especially unlikely to be guided or restrained
by the local general plan.120
These considerations led some state courts, even after Eastlake, to
invalidate referenda on land use decisions; they saw the issues as ad-
116. Id. at 677.
117. See infra Part III.
118. 426 U.S. at 684.
119. Hogue, Eastlake and Arlington Heights: New Hurdles in Regulating Urban Land Use?,
28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 41, 53-66 (1977); Kahn, In Accordance with a ConstitutionalPlan: Proce-
duraliDue Process and Zoning Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1018-20, 1045-48 (1979);
see, e.g., Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated- Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1402-25 (1978); Wolfstone, The Case for a Procedural
Due Process Limitation on the Zoning Referendum: City of Eastlake Revisited, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.
51, 78-84 (1978); Note, The Proper Use of Referenda in Zoning, 29 STAN. L. REV. 819, 832-37
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Proper Use of Referenda]. See also San Diego Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 221-24, 529 P.2d 570, 580-82, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 156-58
(1974) (Burke, J., dissenting); Glenn, State Law Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda
in Connection with Zoning.4mendments, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 265, 286, 304-05 (1978); Note, Arnel
Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa: Rezoning by Initiative and Landowners' Due Process
Rights, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1125-29 (1982); Comment, Zoning by Initiative in California: .4
Critical.Analysis, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 903, 910-15 (1979). But see Comment, The Initiative and
Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1976) (defending use of referendum in land
use decisions).
120. Hogue, supra note 119, at 61-66; Note, Proper Use of Referenda, supra note 119, at 843.
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ministrative or even judicial rather than legislative. 21 Whichever char-
acterization they used, 22 these state courts held that nonlegislative
decisions were to be made by fixed processes according to the standards
already set out in the plan.
But if the land use changes were not legislative for purposes of a
referendum, then why should they be legislative when made by a city
council? The council members, after all, were bound to be swayed by
the interests of their constituents. 23 This anomaly bolstered the step
taken in Fasano: the treatment of all small-scale land use decisions not
as legislative acts but as quasi-judicial decisions, so that even elected
representatives must follow courtlike procedures in applying the over-
all policies of the plan to individual properties. 24
Indeed, the referendum cases pointedly illustrated why individual
land changes might require some check on arbitrariness, regardless of
whether these changes were made by variance boards or elected coun-
cils or the citizens themselves. Perhaps the most important feature of
the referendum discussion was that it justified The Federalist's mistrust
of the militant local community as a type of faction. Referenda on
housing projects were particularly troubling, but even the shopping
center cases showed how an aroused local populace could trample the
legitimate property expectations of an individual owner or devel-
oper. 125 To check unfairness to the individual owner, and to halt the
seeming irrationality of piecemeal changes, some courts turned to pro-
cedures involving some version of consistency with a larger plan. The
content of any given plan seemed less important in these discussions
than the need to restrain local action by some legal standard set out in
advance, which the courts could call upon as a test of reasonableness.
Thus at least two strands of zoning decisions and commentaries
121. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Lakewood, 43 Colo. App. 480, 608 P.2d 361 (1979), rev'd, 638
P.2d 297, 304 (Colo. 1981); City of West Haven v. Impact, 174 Conn. 160, 164-65, 384 A.2d 353,
355 (1978); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 85 1-53, 557 P.2d 1306, 1309-10 (1976) (en
banc). But see Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 521, 620 P.2d 565, 571, 169
Cal. Rptr. 904, 910 (1980).
122. It is not always clear whether the rezoning is being cast as an "administrative" or a
"quasi-judicial" act. See, eg., Wright v. City of Lakewood, 43 Colo. App. at 481, 608 P.2d at 362.
Wolfstone collapses these 'Judicial," "quasi-judicial," and "administrative" designations into the
single category "nonlegislative." Wolfstone, supra note 119, at 87. All require some degree of due
process. The author maintains that the degree of process should depend on the interests involved.
Perhaps this blurring is not surprising. Vile notes the historic blurring of executive and judicial
functions in the doctrine of the separation of powers. M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 88-90, 137-38, 327 (1967).
123. See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 894
(1968).
124. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1502-49 (1978); see also D.
LAUBER, THE HEARING EXAMINER IN ZONING ADMINISTRATION 8-9, 16 (1975).
125. See, e.g., Note, Proper Use of Referenda, supra note 119, at 847-48.
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urged plan jurisprudence as a control on local land use decisions. The
variance and referenda cases, turning as they did on developer de-
mands at the one extreme and popular pressures at the other, illus-
trated the potentially "factional" nature of piecemeal changes, as well
as their particular vulnerability to partial judgments, haste, and lack of
consideration or fairness.
The courts' and commentators' analyses of these two problems
suggested quasi-judicial application of a general plan as a solution.
Like the discretion-structuring model from administrative law, this so-
lution seemed to safeguard carefulness and fairness where the ordinary
legislative process might fail. In addition, it was ideal for judical re-
view. It prescribed readymade standards in the form of a local plan,
thus relieving the courts from having to invent substantive public inter-
est criteria for themselves. At the same time, it enabled them to pre-
scribe a familiar and regularized adjudicative procedural form for the
local decisionmakers. Thus, plan jurisprudence clarified for the courts
both the substance and the procedure for review of local piecemeal
changes, and did so in such a way as to permit considerable judicial
control over all these troublesome "deals."
Although plan jurisprudence offers administrative law principles
as a substitute for the safeguards in larger legislative bodies, it has some
difficulties. The following Part deals with three of them: first, the logi-
cal and practical problems in fitting local land decisions into the mold
of quasi-judicial administrative determinations; second, the equally se-
rious problems with the courts' distinctions between legislative and
quasi-judicial (or administrative)126 land use regulations; third and
most fundamentally, the reasons to doubt that a fixed land use plan,
made in advance of actual control decisions, can or should be the stan-
dard by which those decisions are tested.
II
PROBLEMS IN PLAN JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Treatment of Local Governmental Decisions as Quasi-Judicial
In characterizing local governments' land use changes as quasi-
judicial administrative decisions, the courts must make a prior assump-
tion, namely that local governing bodies can be likened to administra-
tive agencies of the state government. 127 According to plan
jurisprudence, the courts view local governing bodies as if they, like
administrative agencies, could move back and forth between the tradi-
126. See supra note 122.
127. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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tional legislative and judicial functions, wearing a judicial hat when,
for a particular task, the "legislative" rubric cannot ensure fairness and
due consideration. This raises a question: Are local bodies equipped
to make these switches so that, when they supposedly act judicially,
fairness and due consideration are ensured?
The judicial or quasi-judicial function has its own criteria for fair-
ness and due consideration, notably the presence of preexisting stan-
dards and procedural rules that channel discussion and decision of
each individual case toward those standards.' 28 But The Federalist's
examination of judicial due consideration and fairness had another ele-
ment as well: secure tenure of office, in order to promote judicial stead-
iness, impartiality, and insulation from irrelevant pressures.' 29
Administrative agencies, and, even more, elective local governing offi-
cials, lack this additional legitimizing aspect of the federal judicial
branch.
In the traditional doctrine of administrative law, the chief substi-
tute for the guarantee of institutional competence provided by life ten-
ure is technical expertise; mastery of the subject matter ensures that the
agency will come to the correct conclusion.' 30 Even in many adminis-
trative, agencies, technical expertise has become more debatable of late
as an assurance of sound decisions, though no very good alternative
has been identified.13 ' But in local governments' land changes, techni-
cal expertise is no assurance at all, because local governments simply
do not have it.
Administrative agencies traditionally exercise their discretionary
powers within a defined subject matter--consumer product safety, for
example, or environmental protection, or a given form of transpora-
tion.132 Local governing bodies, on the other hand, exercise general
powers of government, 3 3 limited by geographic area rather than by
subject matter. Land use issues might to some degree be regarded as
specialized matters, but on closer examination their specialized quality
128. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (due process hearing requires deci-
sion based on legal rules). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.
1961).
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-24, 527-29 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also
S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 57, at 103-04; Freedman, Crisis andLegiimacy in the Admin-
istrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1041 (1975).
130. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969); ICC v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry., 218 U.S. 88, 102 (1910); J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24, 30-31
(1938); Sabatier, SocialMovements andRegulatoryAgencies: Toward a More Adequate-and Less
Pessimisic-Theory of "Clientele Capture," 6 PoL'Y Sci. 301, 302 (1975).
131. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 57, at 104; Freedman, supra note 129, at 1058-60;
Stewart, supra note 16, at 1682-85.
132. J. LANDIS, supra note 130, at 25-26.
133. 2 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 55, §§ 4.08, 4.80.
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evaporates. It is true that local governments are advised by planning
commissions, but the commissioners are normally ordinary citizens
with no special expertise.'34 Planning commission advisory staffs are
professionals, but even professional planners have come to see their
tasks as more political than technical.' 3  The local governing bodies
who pass zoning ordinances and amendments have more and more
come to use land use controls as a general means of governing.' 36 If
they have any "expertise" in land as such, it derives less from profes-
sional or technical education or information than from sheer familarity
with a locality taken as a whole, in all its complexity. 13 7 This expertise
is of a quite different order from that which substitutes for life tenure,
and the difference has bedeviled the quasi-judicialization of local land
use decisions.
Indeed, any notion of adjudicative impartiality is threatened by
the kind of expertise local decisionmakers do have: namely, political
expertise. Can local decisionmakers really be expected to be impartial
in their quasi-judicial capacity when they are not in their other capaci-
ties? A number of recent cases have focused on council members' ex
parte contacts in quasi-judicial land decisions, and have raised some
particularly knotty problems. For example, may council members, at
the same time that they act quasi-judicially on a rezoning application,
correspond with the applicant about a possible city purchase of some of
the applicant's adjoining land? 138 May they informally solicit the views
of their neighbors and the local merchants before deciding to permit a
proposed shopping center?' 39 Should they be disqualified because they
have previously stated their opposition to a proposed shopping
center? 140
134. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 21.20; Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Con-
trol Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of K..S. Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556,
586-87 (1968).
135. A. CATANESE & W. FARMER, PERSONALITY, POLITICS AND PLANNING 180-91 (1978); see
id. at 193 (advocacy planning tends to favor groups considered to be underrepresented politically).
136. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning
to restrict location of adult movies and bookstores); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-
10 (1974) (upholding zoning to exclude nonfamily multiple person households); cf. Framingham
Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, 373 Mass. 279, 284-87, 367 N.E.2d 606, 610-11 (1977) (over-
turning zoning that prohibits abortion clinics).
137. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
138. Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 585, 589-90, 607 P.2d 722, 725-26 (1980) (yes,
where the contact did not suggest bias on the zoning change).
139. Tierney v. Duris, 21 Or. App. 613, 627-29, 536 P.2d 435, 442-43 (1975) (yes, where the
questioned persons were relatively disinterested, the questions concerned the merits of the permit,
and the contacts were made a part of the record).
140. City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 780-81, 537 P.2d 375, 382-83, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 543, 550-51 (1975) (no, because council members are obligated to talk to constituents and
express their views). See also Turf Valley Assoc. v. Zoning Bd., 262 Md. 632, 644, 278 A.2d 574,
580-81 (1971) (campaign promises do not disqualify council members absent showing of conflict
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In each of these cases the courts have refused to disturb the council
members' actions, despite the supposedly quasi-judicial nature of the
decision. As the California Supreme Court observed in the case that
furnished the last example, 4 ' a councilman "has not only a right but
an obligation to discuss issues of vital concern with his constituents and
to state his views on matters of public importance." The court went on
to quote an earlier case on the role of the council member:
A city councilman is elected usually because of his acquaintanceship
and popularity. He may not be instructed on many of the technical
matters to which he is called upon to pass judgment. He is frequently
an extrovert, who circulates widely in the community and talks with
businessmen and voters about all sorts of questions that may come
before the council.' 42
These problems with ex parte contacts, and with the closely related
appearance-of-fairness doctrine"' point to a fundamental contradic-
tion in the attempt to use administrative law analogies to discipline
local land use decisions. A local council is hard put to take on even
that most fundamental attribute of a judicial body, impartiality.'4 The
situation only worsens if a decision is viewed as quasi-judicial under
administrative doctrine, where judicial attributes supposedly flow from
expertise. If a council's administrative legitimacy rests on "expert"
knowledge of the local area, that expertise comes from contact with the
locality. A large part of a council member's activities rightly consists of
talking to constituents and interested parties about local conditions-
but that contact, in turn, threatens impartiality. The result is that in-
sisting upon quasi-judicialization, which includes impartiality, under-
mines the very justification for treating local governments as expert
administrative agencies in the first place. Thus the hoary hornbook
justification for administrative exercise of judicial powers-agency ex-
pertise over the subject matter-argues against, rather than for, the
quasi-judicial treatment of local land use decisions.
of interest). But see Marmah, Inc. v. Town of Greenwich, 176 Conn. 116, 121-23, 405 A.2d 63, 65
(1978) (procedures appearing to favor project opponents disqualified decision as biased).
141. City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 780, 537 P.2d 375, 382, 122 Cal. Rptr.
543, 550 (1975). The case involved approval of a planned unit development, a decision that Cali-
fornia courts treat as quasi-judicial. See also Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Coun-
cil, 26 Cal. 3d 938, 947, 609 P.2d 1029, 1033, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255, 260 (1980) (campaign
contributions do not give rise to appearance of unfairness).
142. City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 780, 537 P.2d 375, 382-83, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 543, 550-51 (1975). See also City of Beechwood Village v. Council of Saint Matthews, 574
S.W.2d 322, 324 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (presuming council members' personal knowledge of facts).
143. See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 295-98, 502 P.2d 327, 329-30 (1972).'
144. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975); ef.
Verkuil, A Study ofInformalAdjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 739, 787-89 (1976).
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B. Finding the Line Between Legislative and Quasi-judicial Decisions
Even supposing that local governments can make decisions as
judges or administrators, the quasi-judicial treatment of local land use
decisions faces another problem. By what criteria is a land use control
decision quasi-judicial rather than legislative? Most of the case law
and literature in plan jurisprudence has attempted to distinguish piece-
meal changes from others by some index of the scope of the decision.
But exactly when, and by what measure, does the decision become suf-
ficiently broad to become legislative rather than adjudicative? And
does any criterion of scope really make sense, in light of the purposes of
treating these decisions as adjudicative?
In trying to define the scope of a decision sufficiently limited to
merit quasi-judicial treatment, courts and commentators have sug-
gested at least two measurements: the size of the lot or area involved in
the decision, and the numbers of persons affected by the decision.'45
Traditional administrative law doctrine might suggest that, by either of
these criteria, small-scale decisions are appropriate for quasi-judicial
treatment. Both a large area and a large number of parties might raise
issues of general policy, whereas a smaller area, or a smaller number of
parties, would be more likely to raise the individualized and specific
facts appropriate for judicial treatment.'46 But the two measures of
scope do not appear to have equal weight. Commentators and at least
some cases pay more attention to numbers of people than to lot size for
political reasons that rest on considerations drawn from The Federalist
No. 10: the more numerous the affected populace, the greater the inter-
ested parties' ability to protect themselves through the ordinary give-
145. See, e.g., Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 166 & n.3, 215 N.W.2d 179,
191 & n.3 (1974) (Levin, J., concurring); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 469, 221 N.W.2d
303, 304 (1974); Coon, The Initial Characterization of Land Use Issues, 6 ENVTL. L. 121, 126
(1975); Freilich, supra note 17, at vii, ix; Kahn, supra note 119, at 1032 (also suggesting party
favoring change as criterion, e.g., private proposal may be quasi-judicial; category may be collaps-
ible with criterion of numbers of persons affected). See also Developments in the Law-Zoning,
supra note 124, at 1510-13.
146. Economic thinking might also suggest either criterion. In a sufficiently large area, the
developer is more likely to "internalize externalities," and, except at the border, any regulatory
issues are those of general development policy. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302
N.Y. 115, 121-24, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734-35 (1951). In a smaller lot development, on the other hand,
the predominating problems concern the external effects on the neighbors and call for a quasi-
judicial process to measure the respective owners' rights against some standard (i.e., the plan). Cf.
Ellickson, supra note 16, at 772-74 (favoring a judicial or quasi-judicial resolution of land use
disputes between neighbors through "nuisance boards," but with standards drawn from commu-
nity definitions of "neighborly" behavior).
As to numbers of interested persons, large numbers would be unable to transact to settle their
rights by contract, suggesting a need for legislative intervention; but when only a few parties are
involved, public intervention is required only to clarify their respective rights so that they can
bargain thereafter, suggesting a quasi-judicial application of standards.
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and-take of the legislative process, and the less the danger of unequal
influence. 47
Lot size has little bearing on the argument of The Federalist.
Some commentators have noted that though a lot may be very large
and may constitute a significant portion of a town's total land, the sin-
gle owner's or developer's property interests might well collapse under
the weight of a hostile majority of the citizens or representatives.' 48
A less-noted point, however, is that a numbers-of-people criterion
might have equally little bearing in a local setting, where, at their great-
est, total numbers must be relatively small on any issue. The argument
of The Federalist is inapposite, for a local government is not always
comparable to an "extended republic" where the legislature is a forum
for many different issues, where different interests must trade off
against each other in shifting coalitions, and where the entire process
requires a sufficient pause and period of argument to take into account
a more general public interest.'49 The local forum is necessarily a
much smaller unit in which a single issue can split the entire jurisdic-
tion, and in which a minority interest group may have no leverage as
part of any coalition, or even time to assemble arguments directed to a
larger view of the community welfare. Here, a quickly-assembled ma-
jority for, let us say, residential zoning and a short "amortization" of
existing uses may totally defeat owners of gas stations'"0 or grocery
stores'15 1-without the threat of the losers' political retaliation later.
This can be true no matter how many losers there are. In fact, com-
mentators have pointed out that even broad and general planning ordi-
nances have favored certain groups over others.' 2 Indeed, this is part
of the argument for deregulation: that some interests can permanently
capture and exploit local land use regulation at others' expense.' 53
147. See, e.g., Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 155, 161, 603 P.2d 771, 775 (1979);
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 294, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972); see also McKinstry v.
Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Ky. App. 1977) (100 acre parcel rezoning is quasi-judicial). For
commentary, see Coon, supra note 145, at 130-31; Glenn, supra note 119, at 303-06; Kahn, supra
note 119, at 1032-33.
148. Coon, supra note 145, at 128-29.
149. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
150. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 892 (1950) (eight-month amortization period for nonconforming gas station upheld).
151. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 178-79, 121 So. 613, 616, cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929). For a general discussion of amortization, see Graham, Legislative
Techniquesfor the Amortization of the Nonconforming Use: A Suggested Formula, 12 WAYNE L.
REv. 435, 440-46 (1966); Note,, ASuggested Means of Determining the Proper.4mortizatlon Period
for Nonconforming Structures, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1975).
152. See, e.g., H. GANS, PEOPLE AND PLANS 62-65 (1968); see also R. BABCOCK, supra note 4,
at 122-23 (plan may be as arbitrary as zone); cf. A. ALTSCHULER, THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS
399-405 (1965) (planners lack moral focus in the absence of professional standards).
153. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 404-10; Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1206-09; Kmiec, Deregula-
tion, supra note 15, at 41-42.
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At least in the local context, then, the regulatory process may be a
device for one group to dominate another and to bend decisions to its
benefit. If this is true, then even when large numbers of persons are
affected by a decision, they will be unprotected by the coalition-build-
ing safeguard. It follows that the number of persons affected will not
be an accurate measure: If possible harm to minorities is the touch-
stone for the quasi-judicial characterization, then every local land use
decision, even a citywide ordinance, is a candidate.' 54 At the local
level, even the general ordinance may oppress minority interests, and
no decision deserves the loose standard of review implied by the "legis-
lative" designation.
That is not all: the very notion of the plan-as-standard also mili-
tates for universal quasi-judicialization. If the plan is taken seriously,
then all land use regulations, no matter how general in scope, should be
quasi-judicial, because they all involve application of the plan's preest-
ablished standards. If the plan has already set the policy standards to
be applied in approving the new zoning ordinance, or the new planned
unit development, or the new subdivision approval, must not all these
regulatory decisions be viewed as adjudicative rather than legislative?
Insofar as the plan is intended to discipline local decisionmaking, its
logical outcome is to make the nature of all land use regulatory deci-
sions adjudicative.
In short, trying to draw a principled distinction between the judi-
cial decisions and all others is impossible, given the criteria plan juris-
prudence provides. But more important, the idea of a plan itself is
equally problematic, as the next Section will show.
C. Is the Plan Really a Standard?
Plan jurisprudence's quasi-judicialization of land controls requires
the application of a standard, which is normally the local master plan.
Plan jurisprudence is significantly silent about the appropriate content
of any master plan,' 5 perhaps because no general guidelines for con-
tent could possibly bear the weight that plan jurisprudence would put
on them. On several grounds a master plan cannot be the standard by
which to measure individual land use regulatory decisions. Among
these are (1) modem planning doctrine, and (2) actual local practice.
154. See Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 141, 277 P. 308, 311 (1929) (treating
general zoning ordinance as quasi-judicial), overruledby Associated Home Builders of the Greater
Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473, 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48
(1976) (en banc).
155. See, e.g., Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 698-700, 552 P.2d 815, 818-19 (1976) (court
will not prescribe plan format where legislature has not done so). For a discussion of "plans" that
are little more than undigested masses of data, see Tarlock, supra note 134, at 591-92.
1983]
HeinOnline -- 71 Cal. L. Rev. 873 1983
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
L Modern Planning Doctrine
The previous Section suggested that a general plan may unfairly
favor some groups at the expense of others.' 56 In Dan Tarlock's recent
version of that argument, he points out that even if we require regula-
tions to conform to a plan, we beg the question of the legitimacy of the
plan itself;t57 for even plan consistency requirements leave the setting
of goals to the same local governments whose other land use decisions
are suspect.
The traditional answer to this objection is that the plan is adopted
under different circumstances from the ordinary land use decision.
Unlike a simple rezoning, the plan is created in an atmosphere of calm
and deliberation, where expert opinions can be weighed and consid-
ered. 5 Thus, the argument runs, the plan can be adequately consid-
ered precisely because the master plan precedes particular projects,
with all their proponents and objectors and arguments. At the same
time, the plan provides security and fair treatment to the citizenry by
imposing consistent and impartial results later, in actual land deci-
sions.' 59 In the moments of popular excitement or developer entice-
ment, the plan disciplines a wayward local government and prevents it
from bargaining away its own well-considered views or its citizens' se-
curity. At best the plan should assure fairness and due consideration,
without depending on the coalition-building model of the "extended
republic."
This traditional answer may not be satisfactory. It is not at all
clear that local governments--or indeed any governing bodies--oper-
ate very effectively in the cool circumstances envisioned by traditional
planning theory. It is the legislative proposal itself that sets off a clash
of interests in a legislative body, just as it is the actual case that focuses
the attention of a court.'6 Decision theorists have argued that concrete
156. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
157. Tarlock, supra note 5, at 84, 99-101.
158. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901,288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 894
(1968); R. NELSON, supra note 16, at 64; Haar, supra note 33, at 1155; Nelson, supra note 15, at
716-17 (quoting Dunham, Property, City Planning andLiberty, in LAW AND LAND, ANGLO-AMER-
ICAN PLANNING PRACTICE 33-34 (C. Haar ed. 1964)).
159. Bownds v. City of Glendale, 113 Cal. App. 3d 875, 880-81, 170 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345-56
(1980); O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 CaL App. 2d 774, 784-85, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289 (1965); Haar,
The Master Plan, supra note 100, at 365.
160. Alan Altschuler, in his classic study of planning in the Twin Cities, observed that local
political figures did not think in the long-range and generalized terms implicit in general planning;
they were bored by what they saw as abstract exercises and did not take the plans seriously. A.
ALTSCHULER, supra note 152, at 139-41, 310-11; see also Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling
Through," 19 PUB. AD. REv. 79, 88 (1959). Analogous complaints surfaced more recently in Flor-
ida as the state legislature considered its current mandatory planning act; local officials clearly
resented the expense that they would have to undertake on a chore they regarded as at best mar-
ginally useful. Lewis, Florida's Cities Bite the Planning Bullet, PLANNING, Feb. 1979, at 25.
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problems help to focus attention, and lead to superior collection and
evaluation of information.1 6 ' This view suggests that local councils
might well give less careful consideration to an advance general plan
than they do to an actual, specific proposal.
Moreover, since plans are supposed to reflect public participa-
tion-an increasingly important element in modem planning doc-
trine162-- advance general planning might fail precisely because public
attention may not come into focus until the plan's implications become
concrete.1 63 Consider, for example, De Sena v. Gulde,' 64 in which a
municipality's general plan called for light industry in what appeared
to be a black residential area. Apparently at a developer's request, a
particular parcel was rezoned to conform to the plan, and the neighbor-
hood protested vigorously. The council backed down, and restored the
residential zone. The developer sued and won; in the court's view, the
city should have maintained the light industrial rezoning, since mere
protest was insufficient reason to abandon an ordinance that carried
out a plan.' 65 The question raised here is whether the original plan
itself received either as careful attention or as much public participa-
tion as the rezoning did; an actual project, and the controversy sur-
rounding it, may have focused more attention and brought more
consideration to bear than the earlier and necessarily more abstract
plan. Jane Jacobs, a notable critic of planning, has argued that in the
absence of a specific project, planners might assume without real con-
sideration that certain uses always aid or harm others; in fact, however,
the "nonconforming" funeral home or factory may actually stabilize its
residential neighborhood.166 Then too, a local government bent on cir-
cumventing controversy might use an abstract plan, which makes a
finding of "consistency" easier to arrive at, as a means of shutting off
the debate that accompanies an actual project.
In the traditional view of the dispassionately considered general
plan, the plan should replace the protections of a larger legislature, pre-
serving dispassionate fairness and unhurried consideration in each land
use decision. But because some emotional involvement is a necessary
part of attentive decisionmaking, the price of basing a decision on an
161. I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION-MAKING 204-07 (1977).
162. Kaufman, Contemporary Planning Practice: State of the Art, in PLANNING IN AMERICA
115-16 (D. Godschalk ed. 1974). Kaufman stresses, however, that the practices and goals of plan-
ning have not changed greatly over the years. Id. at 118, 128.
163. Lefcoe, supra note 15, at 490-94; Lindblom, supra note 160, at 81. The same criticism
applies to Kmiee's proposal, see Kmiec, Deregulation, supra note 15, for regulation of "land use
intensity." Kmiec would limit public participation to the advance general discussion of desirable
mixes of land use intensities, prior to any actual development project. Id. at 83-84.
164. 24 A.D.2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1965).
165. Id at 171, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46.
166. J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LInE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 232-33 (1961).
1983]
HeinOnline -- 71 Cal. L. Rev. 875 1983
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [
advance plan may be that a vague, abstract, or incompletely aired "ad-
visory opinion" is substituted for an overheated decision.'67
Modem planning doctrine recognizes these problems. At least
since Charles Lindblom's 1959 plea for "muddling through,"' 68 mod-
em planners have shown increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional
"end-state" general plan, against which current proposals are mea-
sured. They have derided the utopian character of such plans, 69 and
for the past decade have insisted that the plan should not be seen as an
end-state depiction of goals determined in advance, but as a "process"
of continual readjustments of goals and policies.17 0 Reflecting this
view, the ALI's model land development statute calls for a periodically
revised plan,' ' and recent planning doctrine stresses that plans must be
up to date.'72 Such a conception of planning rejects the notion of the
plan as a portrait of the final goal toward which current land decisions
strive, and instead treats planning much more as an ongoing process by
which decisionmakers take a "hard look"'173 at the long-term decisions
involved in land development. So conceived, planning blurs into the
"impact analysis" familiar in environmental law, and becomes equated
with "being especially careful."'' 74 The equation even seems to justify
some of the older zoning decisions that took the SZEA language, "in
accordance with a general plan," to mean only "well-considered."'' 75
The modem idea does not mean that planning no longer occurs. It
still does, but the steps taken to promote valued land uses may change
the values themselves. Thus, for example, modem federal planning
167. Brooks suggests that the general plan may paper over disagreements that only emerge at
the point of implementation. Brooks, The Law of Plan Implementation in the United States, 16
URB. L. ANN. 225, 269-70 (1979). See also A. ALTSCHULER, supra note 152, at 324.
168. See Lindblom, supra note 160.
169. H. GANS, supra note 152, at 62; M. ScoTr, supra note 2, at 245; Bolan, Mapping the
Planning Theory Terrain, in PLANNING IN AMERICA, supra note 162, at 13, 24; Krasnowiecki,
supra note 29, at 1032, 1038. See also Lindblom, supra note 160; Riesman, Some Observations on
Community Plans and Utopia, 57 YALE L.J. 173 (1947). For a discussion of Utopian planning, see
L. BENEVOLO, THE ORIoINS OF MODERN TOWN PLANNING 39-84 (1971).
170. Lindblom, supra note 160, is an early major source of the incrementalist view of plan-
ning. See also H. GANS, supra note 152, at 65. Some recent planning enabling legislation at-
tempts to incorporate the view of planning as a process, and provides for periodic review of plans.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3191 (West Supp. 1982); MODEL LAND DEV. CODE §§ 3-104, 3-
105, 3-107 (1975).
171. See supra note 170.
172. See, e.g., Mandelker & Netter, supra note 17, at 57.
173. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
174. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 3-106 comment (ALI Code's scheme is to "focus legislative
attention on problems of physical development ... and on concrete programs aimed at their
solution").
175. Haar, supra note 33, at 1170-73.
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statutes for historic preservation 76 and for the federal agency manage-
ment of public lands 177 suggest that the very process of inventorying
valued resources can jog the planners' imagination as to what may be
desirable for the future;178 and where desired ends compete (as, for ex-
ample, preservation may compete with recreational use), 17 9 the choice
among desired goals alters the range of goals available in the future.
But the more modest, modem conception of planning as a rolling
process is quite different from the conception implicit in plan jurispru-
dence.'80 Planning-as-process cannot be reconciled with a characteri-
zation of the plan as a standard by which to judge individual land
decisions. If the plan is a "process," requiring constant (or at least peri-
odic) alterations according to new conditions, and if specific policy de-
cisions are choices within a range of sometimes competing long-term
goals,' 8' then "plan consistency" is a shifting concept, and could mean
a return to the case-by-case decisionmaking that consistency doctrines
were supposed to overcome.
By the same token, the quasi-judicial character of land decisions
becomes much more problematic. Perhaps because of the difficulties of
using planning-as-process as a standard for decision, some quasi-judi-
cial treatments of land decisions have played down the role of the plan
as a set standard.'82 The difficulty here is that the absence of preexist-
ing standards weakens the case for treating these decisions as quasi-
judicial in the first place.' 83 They are so treated because they apply a
176. National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470a, 470b, 470c to 470w-6).
177. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1711 (1979).
178. Weinberg, Super List, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, July-Aug. 1982, at 10-11. For a discus-
sion of the importance of inventorying in resource management, see S. HAYS, supra note 60, at 69.
179. Sax, Fashioning a Recreation Policyfor our NationalParklands: The Philosophy of Choice
and the Choice of Philosophy, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 973 (1979); see also Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 995, 1003 (D. Utah 1979) (competing goals within federal land policy planning statute).
180. The Fasano court itself commented on the inflexibility that could accompany the quasi-
judicialization of land change decisions. 264 Or. at 587-88, 507 P.2d at 29-30.
181. Even in Oregon, a center of plan jurisprudence on the local level, the courts have recog-
nized that state-level plans may "contain a variety of sometimes-inconsistent land-use objectives,"
and thus local efforts to meet these goals can do no more than "accommodate as much as possible
all applicable planning goals." South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs,
27 Or. App. 647, 654, 557 P.2d 1375, 1380-81 (1976); see also 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 32 Or. App. 413, 426-27, 575 P.2d 651, 656-57,petition denied, 284 Or. 41, 584
P.2d 1371 (1978).
182. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE §§ 2-304, 2-312 (1975). See also Kropf v. City of Sterling
Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 164, 215 N.W.2d 179, 190 (1974) (Levin, J., concurring).
183. An example is the very loose judicial review of modem federal statutes governing the
management of the public domain. Several of these statutes envision multiple uses of the public
lands, and thus "planning" here entails choice among competing goals rather than a fixed end-
state; planning statutes of this sort have been interpreted as allowing very broad discretion to
managing agencies, reviewable only for arbitrariness. See, e.g., Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803
(9th Cir. 1979).
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preexisting policy, and in the absence of a stable preexisting policy, the
quasi-judicial process has no point of reference.
In some cases, to be sure, an end-state plan, or at least one that
projects a desirable state for a long time, may be perfectly reasonable-
if we know what we want. An aspect of coastal planning is an example.
For all the multimillion dollar questions of offshore mineral leases and
coastal condominiums, one major issue in coastal management is pre-
serving the beach as a recreational and visual resource. 1 4 At least one
desirable end-state is easy to envision: its natural state. Even though it
is impossible both to use the beach and to leave it completely un-
spoiled, a utopian or fixed plan makes some sense here, because we do
in fact have an image of the ideal, and can determine its elements with
some precision. Similarly, built-up areas and established neighbor-
hoods are susceptible to a utopian vision, which again is often simply
stasis, or at least no major change. It is no wonder that, as Richard
Babcock and Clifford Weaver have remarked, classic zoning is alive
and well in urban neighborhoods." 5 In these areas too we know what
we want, i.e., essentially what is there now. This knowledge can shape
an end-state plan; indeed, we have already arrived at the end-state, and
the "plan" can provide a standard by which to judge individual land
use decisions. 186
But the traditional end-state plan is least appropriate for develop-
ing areas, where-in the absence of concrete proposals-we seldom
have a clear vision of the end-state we desire, or even what the interme-
diate states along the way will look like."8 7 These are also areas in
which land use controls can make a substantial difference to the ulti-
mate character of development.18 8 It is precisely here, however, that
local governments most strongly resist the limitations that end-state
planning would impose on their discretion.
184. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30251 (West 1977) (development to be sited and devel-
oped to protect views of ocean and minimize alteration of natural land forms).
185. C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FUTURE FRONTIER 182
(1979).
186. Historic zones are the best examples of plans in which the test for alteration is "compati-
bility" with existing structures. See Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law
of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 508 (1981). Perhaps "compatibility" is the unspo-
ken test for many if not all land use decisions in developed areas; historic district zones simply
make this explicit, and have a more rigid test of compatibility. For a discussion of the ambiguities
inherent in the idea of "compatibility" or "harmony" in historic districts, see id. at 5 10-11.
187. D. MANDELKER, supra note 5, at 63-66, 103-04, 165. The difficulties of planning for
undeveloped areas have long been recognized. See, e.g., NATIONAL PLANNING CONFERENCE,
NEw HORIZONS IN PLANNING 56-59 (1937) (remarks of Wallace Penfield).
188. D. MANDELKER, supra note 5, at 45.
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2 The Pattern of Local Practice
Local governments exhibit a marked talent for evading close ex-
amination of the conformity of their regulations to preexisting plans. A
venerable avoidance technique is vagueness; if the local government
adopts a sufficiently vague plan, any land use ordinance arguably con-
forms.18 9 In addition, local governments have continued to develop
new devices to retain "flexibility." All of these put the locality into the
desirable position of being able to bargain ad hoc with individual de-
velopers. Variances and conditional use permits--greatly expanded
since SZEA days-are also traditional; 19° and in more recent years we
have seen more elaborate devices such as "floating zones,"'191 "planned
unit developments,"' 92 and "development rights transfers,"' 193 all of
which tacitly admit that a locality has no fixed plan for appropriate
development, but instead wants to deal with individual projects as they
arise. 19 And even if localities do have a plan, they often do not intend
to stick by it; they retain case-by-case control by zoning land for uses
slightly different from the predicted development, and by modifying
the original zoning with individual variances or rezoning amendments
on the developer's request. 95
The mandatory planning statutes and Fasano -like decisions are ef-
forts to force development decisions into a more fixed pattern, 96 and to
avoid precisely the ad hoc decisionmaking that local legislatures clearly
prefer. But such requirements are unlikely to quash local inventiveness
in retaining ad hoc control. When required to conform regulations to
their respective master plans, for example, a number of California ju-
risdictions altered not the regulations but the plans. 97 The California
189. See, e.g., Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 704, 552 P.2d 815, 821 (1976); McMillan v.
American Gen. Fin. Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 175, 131 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1976).
190. R. BABCOCK, supra note 4, at 7-10. The discretionary "conditional use" permit, granted
without respect to plan consistency, appears to be capable of surviving new mandatory planning
and consistency requirements. See, eg., Hawkins v. County of Main, 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 126
Cal. Rptr. 754 (1976); Sierra Club v. County of Alameda, 73 Cal. App. 3d 572, 140 Cal. Rptr. 864,
officially depublishedpursuant to CAL. CT. R. 976(d), 572 P.2d 755, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (en bane).
191. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951); cf. Eves
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960) (invalidating township's attempted
rezoning as not in accordance with comprehensive zoning plan).
192. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development, supra note 104.
193. See, e.g., Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973).
194. MODEL LAND DEa. CODE §§ 196-200 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
195. Id See also Booth, supra note 107, at 764; Krasnowiecki, supra note 29, at 1033-34,
1048-49.
196. Fasano, 264 Or. at 582-84, 507 P.2d at 27-28; Camp v. Mendocino Bd. of Supervisors,
123 Cal. App. 3d 334, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1981); see also C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note
185, at 271-72.
197. Brooks, supra note 167, at 243-44. For cases involving plan changes made simultane-
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legislation mandating local planning has now taken the precaution of
forbidding localities to alter the underlying plan more frequently than
three times a year. 98 But California cities have already begun to cir-
cumvent the thrice-yearly limitation by saving up individual piecemeal
changes for seasonal plan changes en masse.1 99 In the face of
mandatory planning, Mendocino County revived a classic flexibility
device-the vague plan-in a "plan" that consisted of a box of various
unrelated reports and memoranda.2" The insistence of the state's at-
torney general seems to have pushed the county into a more definite
statement of its planning standards.20 But given the fertility of the
local legislative imagination in protecting ad hoc control over individ-
ual land development projects, we may expect new flexibility devices to
sprout in the wake of planning statutes and Fasano -like cases.20 2
Such irrepressible inventiveness casts some doubt on the legislative
or judicial capacity to insist on a detailed advance plan as the standard
by which later decisions are tested. If a master plan is vague, easily
changeable, or packed with opportunities for the use of flexibility de-
vices, then virtually any land use regulation can "conform" to the
plan.2 3 And if this is so, statutory consistency may be trivialized, and
all the quasi-judicial procedures in applying the plan become an elabo-
rate charade-and so does judicial review of those quasi-judicial
decisions.
ously with zoning changes, see Mountain Defense League v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal. App.
3d 723, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1977). See also Winkelman v. City of Tiburon, 32 Cal. App. 834, 108
Cal. Rptr. 415 (1973). For a Washington case involving simultaneous change, see Barrie v. Kitsap
County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 852, 613 P.2d 1148, 1154 (1980).
198. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65361(a) (West Supp. 1982).
199. Mandelker, Sullivan, Kane & Beatty, Mandatory Comprehensive Planning: A Perspective
from Three States, in LAND USE LAW: ISSUES FOR THE EIGHTIES 85, 89 (E. Netter ed. 1981).
200. Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 123 Cal. App. 3d 334, 349 n.8, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 620, 630 n.8 (1981).
201. Id
202. See, e.g., Hawkins v. County of Manin, 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1976)
(consistency requirement not applied to individual conditional use permit where general zoning
ordinance is consistent with plan). For a discussion of some gaps in California's mandatory plan-
ning and consistency requirement, widely regarded as the most stringent in the nation, see
Hagman, Inconsistency on Mandatory Planning and Consistency, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.,
May 1982, at 5, 6. But see Steiner & Abbot, id. at 7 (reply).
203. For California cases dealing with ambiguous or nonexistent plans or standards, see Si-
erra Club v. County of Alameda, 73 Cal. App. 3d 572, 140 Cal. Rptr. 864 ("general welfare"
sufficient standard for conditional use permit), officially depublished pursuant to CAL. CT. R.
976(d), 572 P.2d 755, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (en banc); McMillan v. American Gen.
Fin. Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 175, 131 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1976) (upholding local "consistency" finding
where plans ambiguous). Cf Save El Toro Ass'n v. Days, 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282
(1977) (invalidating subdivision approval because it could not be consistent with a nonexistent
plan). For discussions of plan vagueness in other states, see Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 552
P.2d 815 (Or. 1976); Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 225-26, 401 A.2d 906, 910
(1979).
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Legal commentators have deplored local governments' evasions of
planning, and their unwillingness to deal with development proposals
in the generalized way implicit in the idea of planning. But except for
beaches and other areas where we can envision the desired end-state,
these repeated local efforts to evade end-state planning confirm the
planning theorists' doubts about such plans, and suggest that the
plan/implementing ordinance model simply may not be compatible
with the local land use decisionmaking process. This local process
seems to move in the direction of more bargaining, more participation,
and more personal knowledge and one-on-one contact. An effort to
make local decisionmakers behave in a markedly different manner
might well backfire, encouraging false and evasive plans, and false and
evasive escapes therefrom. We do not want plan consistency or quasi-
judicial procedures for themselves; we want them to ensure care and
fairness in the local land decision process.
To a very considerable degree, the emergence of plan jurispru-
dence is the work of the courts, as they have sought some way to sub-
ject local land decisions to meaningful review in order to ensure
carefulness and fairness.2" As the courts and critics have rightly per-
ceived, these decisions should not be treated as legislative acts. They
are too limited to bring forth the clash of interests and the coalition-
building processes that restrict legislatures when they enact general
measures and that justify a loose review of those measures. But, as I
have argued in this Part, the effort to quasi-judicialize these piecemeal
changes, and to subordinate them to an advance plan, at once asks too
much and too little: too much in supposing that local governments, in
the absence of concrete proposals, can look far into the future and state
guidelines by which to adjudicate future decisions; too little in that the
plan itself may be too abstract or too partisan to guide future develop-
ment fairly, or indeed to check meaningfully the exercise of local dis-
cretion-even where that discretion is dressed up as the quasi-judicial
application of a plan.
Thus, piecemeal changes are no more quasi-judicial than they are
legislative. Indeed, the rubric "quasi-judicial" leads to confusion about
the procedures that are appropriate for piecemeal changes, and per-
petuates a rigid, unrealistic conception of planning.
We have arrived, then, at a point where it appears that "piecemeal
change" local land decisions defy our normal governmental categoriza-
204. Brooks, supra note 167, at 252-54; Griffin & Becker, supra note 10, at 632-34; Kras-
nowiecki, Planned Unit Development, supra note 104, at 74-77. For an example of the courts'
stress on their need for a basis of review, see, for example, City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. City
Council, 59 Cal. App. 3d 869, 886-88, 129 Cal. Rptr. 173, 181-82 (1976); Parkridge v. City of
Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 463-64, 573 P.2d 359, 365 (1978). Cf. P. Nonet, supra note 99, at 181.
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tions, and escape the safeguards built into those categories. Neither
"legislative" nor "adjudicative" characterizations encompass the full
range of considerations attendant upon these small changes; moreover,
neither seems capable of ensuring due consideration and fairness in
these decisions. The remainder of this Article argues for a different
approach to piecemeal local land decisions, an approach that treats
them neither as legislation nor as adjudication, but as what they have
been pejoratively called: deals.
III
ALTERNATIVE TRADITIONS, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
This Article has concentrated on plan jurisprudence because, de-
spite its difficulties, it contains at least two important ideas about piece-
meal changes and why they are so problematic. As to the
decisionmaker, plan jurisprudence recognizes that local governmental
bodies cannot be treated as legislatures, whose actions are legitimized
and safeguarded by the fragmentation of interests and the give-and-
take of coalition-building. As to the changes themselves, plan jurispru-
dence recognizes that such changes are guided not so much by gener-
ally applicable rules as by a desire to adjust conflicting claims about
property development made by limited numbers of claimants.20 5 Thus,
piecemeal land use decisions cannot be legitimized by seeing them as
parts of a legislative stacking of coalition decisions, since the parties
deal with each other at most intermittently.
Plan jurisprudence recognizes that alternative safeguards are
needed precisely because the legislative safeguards may be missing.
The insights of plan jurisprudence can, however, inform a jurispru-
dence that does not rely on the transformation of piecemeal changes
into judicial actions. Let us then reexamine these two fundamental as-
pects of piecemeal changes: (1) the local character of the deci-
sionmakers, and (2) the dispute-resolving character of the change
decision.
A. The Local Context. Alternative Bases of Legitimacy
One of the most striking facts about piecemeal land changes is that
they are constantly left to local governmental bodies.2 6 Why indeed
205. See, e.g., Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 299, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972)
(zoning amendment adjusts rights of proponents and opponents of the zoning change); Hyson v.
Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 65-67, 217 A.2d 578, 585 (1966) (legislative decisions
involve general rules while quasi-judicial decisions settle contested cases). For zoning as a defini-
tion of collective property rights, see Nelson, supra note 15, at 720.
206. This is true even in the Quiet Revolution proposals to centralize some portions of land
use control in the state; the bulk of everyday land control decisions would continue to be local.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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should local bodies, with their blurring of the tripartite separation of
powers,2"7 their lack of conventional Federalist restraints, and their
consequent susceptibility to corruption, unfair influence, and
majoritarian pressure-why should this level of government be charged
with these sensitive adjustments of individual property rights?
Albert Hirschman's highly imaginative book, Exit, Voice, andLoy-
alty20 8 suggests some answers and some bases for a theory of local le-
gitimacy distinct from Federalist-based political thought. Hirschman
began by asking why competition did not suffice to improve the quality
of some firms' output-that is to say, why the customer's ever-present
option to "exit" to a competitor failed to prod the firms into improving
the quality of their products. He concluded that improvement in quali-
ty often required that some customer make an articulated effort to
change things, which Hirschman called "voice,'2°9 an effort which is
precluded when exit is too easy. Thus in situations where quality of
output especially matters, the ideal institutional structure combines op-
portunities for voice with at least a limited opportunity for exit as a
threat behind voice.210 Reinforcing voice, without entirely foreclosing
exit, is what Hirschman calls "loyalty": a preference for sticking with
the institution, and for attempting to change matters rather than
leaving.211
Hirschman found a potential for the ideal combination of exit and
voice, reinforced by loyalty, in certain types of institutions, notably
political parties and volunteer organizations.21 2 But local government
can also combine Hirschman's elements. Indeed, an alternative tradi-
tion in American political thought has virtually always stressed the pos-
sibility of participation and the option of going elsewhere to legitimize
local authority.
Participation or voice is a particularly venerable legitimator of lo-
cal government.213 While The Federalist is our chief text for the legiti-
207. For a recent example of the mixture of functions, see Village of Covington v. Lyle, 69
Ohio St. 2d 659, 433 N.E.2d 597 (1982) (upholding a "mayor's court"). The mixture of local
functions is also reflected in such quaint local titles as "police jury" (Louisiana parish governing
board) and "fiscal court" (Kentucky county governing board). Plan jurisprudence in effect reflects
the mixture of legislative and judicial functions in local councils, and attempts to classify particu-
lar actions as belonging to one or another function.
208. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 23.
209. Id. at 30.
210. Id at 53, 55, 120-23.
211. Id at 77.
212. Id at 121.
213. See, eg., Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis
of the American System, 14 LAW & Soc'y REv. 663, 689-90 (1980); Sandalow, supra note 71, at
709-10. Sandalow is skeptical of the "closeness to the people" justification, however, for reasons
drawn from The Federalist No. 10. For a sympathetic account of the argument for local govern-
ment as a focus for civic participation, see Frug, supra note 54, at 1068-71.
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macy of large-scale government, the Federalists' contemporary
opponents, the so-called Antifederalists, advocated a government of lo-
cal participation and citizen control.
The Antifederalists' treatment of representation is particularly
striking for its doctrine of local participation.214 For them, representa-
tion was a second-best substitute for direct popular government,2 t5 and
was feasible only in small districts. Here representatives personally
know and share the concerns of their constituents, and they can-in a
widely shared eighteenth-century view of representation-"mirror" or
"picture" the various constituencies.2 16 Thus the Antifederalists op-
posed the Federalists' large "consolidated government, '217 with its nec-
essarily large electoral districts. These distant and false representatives
would enact laws to which the people did not genuinely consent, be-
cause the laws were not made by the citizens themselves, or by persons
like them.218
The Antifederalists' stress on the consensual and participatory
character of government and their vision of the nation as a collection of
self-defining communities 1 had deep roots in the past and was re-
flected as well in contemporary European political thought and prac-
214. See generally Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in I THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 15-23 (H. Storing ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ANTI-FEDERALIST].
215. 2 Elliot, supra note 64, at 227-28 (speech of M. Smith in New York ratifying convention);
see also Speeches by Melancton Smith, in 6 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 148-76. I cite
Elliot in the hope that the reader may be drawn to read the extraordinary exchanges between
Smith and Alexander Hamilton. See also Storing, supra note 214, at 17-18.
216. C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS lii (1966). For the use of the "picture" metaphor,
see 2 Elliot, supra note 64, at 245 (speech of M. Smith in New York ratifying convention); 3 id. at
32 (speech of G. Mason in Virginia ratifying convention). On this "picture" version of the mean-
ing of representation generally, see H. PITKIN, supra note 62, at 60-61. See also Observations
Leading to a Fair Examination of the System Of Government Proposed by the Late Convention,'And
to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in t. In a Number of Letters from the Federal
Farmer to the Republican [hereinafter cited as Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer], in 2 ANTI-FEDER-
ALiST, supra note 214, at 214, 267-69 (attributed to R.H. Lee); 3 Elliot, supra note 64, at 322
(speech of P. Henry in Virginia ratifying convention) (the people should be "acquainted with the
candidates" and enjoy "a confidential connection between the electors and the elected"); Speeches
ofPatrick Henry in the Virginia State Rat(fying Convention, in 5 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 214,
at 207-54; Speech of George Mason in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention, in 5 ANTI-FEDERAL-
iST, supra note 214, at 255-59.
217. C. KENYON, supra note 216, at xlii-xliii; Storing, supra note 214, at 10.
218. 2 Elliot, supra note 64, 227, 245-48 (speech of M. Smith in New York ratifying conven-
tion). See also Letters of Centinel, in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 130, 142 (attributed
to Samuel Bryan); Essays of Brutus, in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 358, 369, 379-80
(attributed to Robert Yates). These authors frequently expressed the view that only persons of
wealth and stature--the "natural aristocracy"--could be elected in large districts, and that such
persons would not understand or sympathize with the interests of the "yeomanry." See, e.g. , id. at
384-86; Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer, supra note 216, in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 214, at
264-70.
219. Storing, The Problem of Big Government, in A NATION OF STATES 67, 70-71 (R. Goldwin
ed. 1974); see also Essays of Brutus, in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 214, at 274.
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tice.22° Perhaps it is not surprising that despite The Federalist's
domination of mainstream American thinking about representation,
the quite antithetical Antifederalist tradition has stubbornly persisted
in American discussions of local government, though in fragmentary
form. The belief that localities were best equipped to govern them-
selves underlay the "home rule" movement in the nineteenth cen-
tury,22' and the corollary that local government is particularly
responsive has reemerged in the rhetoric of "citizen participation" and
of local government's "closeness to the people" in more recent federal
programs to assist local governments. 222  Indeed, it is implicit in the
charge that local governments have not fully engaged the entire spec-
trum of the citizenry in their decisions.223 The charge suggests that we
expect that local government should be a "picture" of the local popu-
lace, giving voice to its various elements.
Aside from scholarly work directly advocating decentralization of
government,224 commentators occasionally lend more oblique support
to the notion of local responsiveness. In some historians' recent reas-
sessments of the much-decried corruption of nineteenth century cities,
for example, the political bosses and machines have been treated with a
certain sympathy, and with some respect for the machines' achieve-
ment in integrating immigrants into American life.225 Despite its cor-
220. Diamond, What the Framers Meant by Federalism, in A NATION OF STATES, supra note
219, at 25, 35-37. The most notable contemporary was of course Rousseau. See Rousseau, The
Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES bk. 2, ch. 9 (G. Cole trans. Dutton
ed. 1950). Montesquieu also thought popular rule compatible only with small-scale government.
See Diamond, supra, at 36. The then novel and experimental idea was the notion of representa-
tion in an extended republic where no popular consensus was required save a willingness to accept
the adventitious outcomes of the coalition-building process. See Beer, Federalism, Nationalism,
and Democracy in America, 72 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 9, 13-14 (1978).
221. C. ADRIAN & E. GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE FOR-
MATION OF TRADITIONS, 1775-1870, at 41-43 (1976); Sandalow, supra note 71, at 647-48 (home
rule movement seen as a reaction against state corruption of local affairs). As a reaction against
state intrusion into local affairs, the home rule movement may be a particularly interesting com-
parison to the Quiet Revolution efforts to increase state involvement in local land decisions. See
supra notes 4, 12-24 and accompanying text. Not all home rule advocates were particularly demo-
cratic, however. On differences within the home rule position, see M. HOLLI, REFORM IN DE-
TROIT 169-81 (1969).
222. Susskind,JRevenue Sharing and the Lessons of the New Federalism, 8 URB. L. ANN. 33, 36,
42 (1974).
223. Id. at 45-51. For my own minor contribution to this literature, see C. Rose, Citizen
Participation in Revenue Sharing: A Report from the South, reprinted in ProposedExtension of the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act: Hearings on H.. 6558 and Related Bills Before the Sub-
comm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 628 (1975).
224. See Beer, supra note 220, at 9.
225. See, e.g., E. GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT- THE CONSPICU-
OUS FAILURE, 1870-1900, at 63-69 (1974); S. WARNER, THE PRIVATE CITY 156 (1968); Cornwell,
Bosses, Machines, andEthnic Groups, in THE CITY Boss IN AMERICA 124-38 (A. Callow ed. 1976).
The "machine" was sometimes a vehicle for the entry of former slaves into civic life as well. See
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rosion of civic well-being, the machine and its neighborhood precinct
organization emerge in some ways as the Antifederalist ideal of a polit-
ical mirror reflecting even the meanest citizens; ward boss representa-
tives certainly mingled with their constituents and knew them well, and
helped to accommodate the needs of very different population groups
through highly personal assistance.226
Perhaps less familiar in the alternative tradition is the idea of exit
to legitimize local authority, but the opportunity for exit has been a
constant threat behind voice at the local level. Dissenters in colonial
New England villages punctuated their demands to be heard by threat-
ening-and occasionally acting on their threats-to withdraw to form
their own communities. 227 In the early days of the republic, departure
to form new communities was an outlet for dissatisfaction, a pattern
seen perhaps most strikingly in utopian communities. 2 8 More re-
cently, the political economist Charles Tiebout suggested that local
governments (unlike the national government) resemble competing
firms, each offering a package of goods, services, and amenities, and
chosen by its residents for those reasons.229 Thus our seemingly irra-
tional metropolitan divisions, with their vast numbers of separate polit-
ical units, in fact offer the safeguard of exit, so that individuals may
choose their neighbors and the polity within which they can preserve
their preferences. 30
None of this is to romanticize local politics, but rather to suggest
that local government may be legitimized by factors unlike those that
legitimize government on a larger scale. As we have seen, in a large
government, legislative fairness and carefulness is assured by the shift-
ing coalitions among interest groups; and judicial fairness and careful-
ness arise from the application of consistent norms by insulated and
LANDMARKS HERITAGE PRESERVATION COMM'N, A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION IN OMAHA 57 (1980).
226. E. GRIFFITH, supra note 225, at 72-73; S. WARNER, supra note 225, at 156; Cornwell,
supra note 225, at 127; Handlin, Why the Immigrant Supported the Machine, in THE CITY BOSS IN
AMERICA, supra note 225, at 98-102. For a comparison to today's city politics, see Purnick, New
York Blacks Say They've Lost PoliticalPower, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (demise
of "machine" means end of ethnically balanced political tickets).
227. K. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: DEDHAM,
MASS., 1636-1736, at 100-16 (1970).
228. See generaly A. BESTOR, BACKWOODS UTOPIAS (2d ed. 1970); A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S
FERMENT 108-224 (2d ed. 1962).
229. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418, 423 (1956).
230. Id.; cf Grubb, The Dynamic Implications of the Tiebout Model: The Changing Composi-
tion of Boston Communities, 1960-1970, 10 PUB. FIN. Q. 17 (1982) (challenging Tiebout's theory
with use of sociological data). Some approval of a pattern of local differentiation may be implicit
in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding local land regulations that
sharply restricted nonfamily living arrangements). But see Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down ordinance that had restrictive definition of family).
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impartial judges. The legitimacy of local decisionmaking, on the other
hand, may derive from interested parties' opportunities for a combina-
tion of Hirschman's elements: voice in the ability to participate in deci-
sions, and in having decisionmakers who know the issues directly and
who try to secure the parties' acceptance of a final decision and their
continued integration in the community; and exit in the parties' ulti-
mate opportunity to withdraw and go elsewhere. The Federalists re-
jected this understanding of government, 23' but they spoke chiefly to
justify national government. In local government, it may be appropri-
ate to look to a form of decisionmaking that is neither legislative nor
judicial in the Federalist model.232 This alternative model rests on
more traditional legitimating factors: citizens' participation, backed by
possible departure. Hence the first insight of plan jurisprudence-that
the local bodies making piecemeal land decisions may be unreliable as
legislatures in a Madisonian sense-may lead us not to judicialization
but to some solution outside the traditional separation of powers.
B. Piecemeal Changes as Property Disputes. Mediation as a
Resolution Process
The second major insight of plan jurisprudence is that decisions
making piecemeal changes are different from general legislative deci-
sions. In treating these small change decisions as quasi-judicial appli-
cations of preexisting norms, plan jurisprudence in effect treats them as
resolutions of property rights disputes.
This dispute-resolving treatment brings piecemeal changes into
theoretical alignment with the original purposes of public land use con-
trols. Modem land use regulation began as an effort to forestall nui-
sances-that is, to prevent conflict over property interests claimed by
two or more parties, or at least to minimize the damage that arises from
the proximity of conflicting uses.2 33 Changes in land use regulation pit
231. Storing, supra note 219, at 81. See, e.g., 2 Elliot, supra note 64, at 254-57 (comments of
A. Hamilton in the New York ratifying convention rejecting small districts that would have a low
number of constituents per representative). Hamilton also had some unflattering things to say
about the notion that the ideal form of self-government was direct democracy, for which represen-
tation was an imperfect substitute. ld. at 253 (The "very character [of direct democracies of the
past] was tyranny; their figure, deformity... an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of delib-
eration, but prepared for every enormity.").
232. As was suggested earlier, see supra text accompanying note 117, the Eastlake decision
implies that individual states can decide for themselves whether to characterize local land deci-
sions as legislative or as judicial-and presumably they may characterize them as something else
altogether.
233. See, for example, the ordinance limiting livestock holding and butchering locations in
the famous Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), and the statute restricting wharf
extensions into a harbor in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). See also R.
LOTCHIN, SAN FRANcIsco 1846-56: FROM HAMLET TO CITY 11-13, (1974).
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the proponent of change against the interests of neighboring property
owners or some larger segment of the community.23 4 The dispute rests
on conflicting views about the boundaries of property rights, which
may be quite fluid. 35
Of course, conflicts must be resolved fairly; we have seen that fair-
ness is not automatic in local government. But adjudication is not the
only fair resolution. Once we have freed ourselves from the idea that
local government must act according to separation-of-powers doctrine
(directly or in its "quasi" form in administrative law), we can turn to
other dispute-resolving forms. Anthropological literature,236 and, in-
creasingly, modem legal literature, 237 suggest negotiation and particu-
234. Cf Kmiec, Deregulation, supra note 15, at 90-93 (arguing that neighbors should have no
role in individual land use decisions). This view may follow from the author's conception of land
use controls as essentially a tax on the development value of land, rather than as an effort to
minimize adverse uses; he relegates adverse use problems primarily to the law of nuisance. Id. at
84. Closely related is the author's preference for large projects. Id. at 96 n.240. Presumably, this
is in part because externalities can be internalized in large projects (except at the border) and the
neighbors' objections to adverse uses may be lessened.
235. See R. NELSON, supra note 16, at 17 (modern land regulation confers a collective prop-
erty right on the neighborhood); Nelson, supra note 15, at 719-21.
236. For a discussion of this literature, see THE DISPUTING PROcESS-LAw IN TEN SOCIETIES
1-40, 351-61 (L. Nader & H. Todd eds. 1978). See also P. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIA-
TIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979).
237. See, e.g. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971). One exchange on the subject began with Danzig, Towardthe Creation of
a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973), and com-
ments thereon by Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 63, 86-87 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Festiner, Influences]; Danzig & Lowy, Everyday
Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV.
675 (1975) (reply); Felstiner, Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 LAW & Soc',
REV. 695 (1975) (response) [hereinafter cited as FelstinerAvoidance]. See also Galanter, Justice in
Many Rooms, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 147, 161-69 (M. Cappelletti ed.
1982); Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311 (1980-8 1). For a discussion of recent European interest in dispute reso-
lution through mediation and negotiation, see Gottwald, Alternativen sum zivilen Justizverfahren,
1982 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK Heft 1, 28. See also Cappelletti & Garth, Access to Justice
and the Welfare State: An Introduction, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 14-20
(M. Cappelletti ed. 1982). Contract or "rulemaking" negotiation (as distinguished from dispute
negotiation or mediation, see Eisenberg, supra, at 665) is of course central in collective bargaining
in labor law, but there is currently also a new interest in dispute mediation in labor matters. See
Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to
Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 270 (1982); Franklin, Costs and Tensions Cut in Mine Mediation
Plan, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1982, § 1, at 16, col. 1. A cautionary appraisal of the applicability of
anthropological mediation models to contemporary American institutions is made in Felstiner,
Influences, supra; Garth, The Movement Toward Procedural Informalism in North American and
Western Europe, A CriticalSurvey, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 183, 196 (R. Abel ed.
1982); Merry, The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies, in 2 THE POLITICS
OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra, at 17, 33-40. These authors stress that mediation depends on a
pattern of ongoing relationships among parties; land use changes, of course, normally do involve
long-term relationships between new developments and neighbors.
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larly mediation as an alternative dispute-resolving model especially
appropriate at the local or sublocal level.z3s
This literature suggests the following schematic representation as a
rough contrast between adjudicatory and negotiative/mediative dis-
pute-resolving methods:
Adjudication Negotiation/Mediation
Parties address third party Parties address each other directly
or through third party mediator239
Third party is disinterested, Third party may have stake in
passive successful resolution, takes active
part especially as spokesman for
community24
Process narrows arguments and Process expands arguments,
information to address limited information2 4 1
number of formal principles
Norms are few in number, stable Norms are numerous, open ended
(may overlap, shift in course of
proceeding)242
Result is decision based on formal Result is accommodation of
principles, one party wins and parties, directed to their future
other loses relations243
Result (decision) is basis for Result (accommodation) is
future decisions suggestive but not decisive for
future accommodations244
I have suggested at various points in this Article that proceedings for
piecemeal changes are far more realistically perceived as mediative
than quasi-judicial. This is true with regard to the quintessential small
change, the variance: adjustment boards treat requests for special
zoning treatment as potential sources of disputes, taking into account
neighborhood protests and imposing conditions in order to reach
238. Danzig, supra note 237, at 2-3.
239. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at xvii, 3-5, 20-21, 210; see also Eisenberg, supra note 237,
at 655; Felstiner, Influences, supra note 237, at 69; Gulliver, Negotiations and Mediations, in
WORKING PAPERS FROM THE PROGRAM IN LAW AND SocIETY, No. 3, at 1-3 (1973); Susskind &
Weinstein, supra note 237, at 314.
240. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 214-19; Fuller, supra note 237, at 338 (quoting R.
BARTON, IFUGAO LAW 87 (1969)).
241. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 52; Danzig, supra note 237, at 43; Gulliver, supra note
239, at 9; Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 237, at 5-7.
242. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 8-12; Eisenberg, supra note 237, at 642-46 ("closed" vs.
"open-ended"); Felstiner, Influences, supra note 237, at 70.
243. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 16-17; Danzig, supra note 237, at 43; Fuller, supra note
237, at 327. For a discussion of all-or-nothing decisions in the courts, see Coons, Approaches to
Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 750 (1964).
244. Eisenberg, supra note 237, at 649-53.
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accommodation. More sophisticated devices such as "planned unit
developments" do the same (although sometimes on a larger scale):
local boards attend to disputes and attempt to find packages of
conditions that will lead to accommodation.
Even where the courts reject these "dealing" qualities and attempt
to treat piecemeal changes quasi-judicially, they seem unable to avoid
mediative forms, with the concomitant expansion of issues and
accommodation-centered goals. A Kentucky intermediate court ac-
knowledged this expansion: "[M]ost such proceedings involve
emotional responses to technical issues . . . . Those opposed to any
rezoning may be intimidated by an awesome formalistic procedure
... . [A]ll parties who appeared were given ample opportunity to
express their opinions . . . [and] the public had a substantial op-
portunity to protest the zoning change .... -24- As to
accommodation, a New York court remarked, in declining to interfere
with the local board's special exception decision, that such issues "are
best resolved by 'common sense judgments' of 'representative citizens
doing their best to make accommodations between . . . community
pressures'.""
A mediation model is more realistic and less distorting than plan
jurisprudence in deciphering not only the procedures of piecemeal
changes, but also the relationships among planning, general
ordinances, and piecemeal changes.247 In particular, if piecemeal
245. Fiscal Court v. Ogden, 556 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Ky. 1977).
246. Burger King Corp. v. Amelkin, 70 A.D.2d 627, 416 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1979) (quoting Lemir
Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 25, 181 N.E.2d 407, 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (1962)).
247. Plan jurisprudence envisions the master plan as a relatively fixed document, which is
implemented by a presumptively valid general ordinance; when the general regulation is in turn
altered, the change is presumptively invalid. A mediation model suggests a very different view of
the plan/general ordinance/piecemeal change triad. First, a mediation model takes a much looser
view of planning as a source of norms. Negotiative or mediative norms are open-textured in the
sense that they may change, overlap, and, to some degree, exclude each other. See supra note 242.
Thus, where planning is a source of norms, it entails not a fixed end-state, but rather the
inventorying of valued resources, perceived problems, and desidirata for future development,
where it is recognized that not all valued outcomes may be realized simultaneously but must be
balanced against each other. An advance plan may thus act as a source of norms in a mediation
process, but cannot set forth a definitive answer, nor can advance planning act as an exclusive set
of norms, since actual decisions may raise other values and ultimately change the plan itself.
Second, in this model, a general zoning ordinance or other generally applicable land
regulation is not a concrete implementation of some fixed plan, but rather a statement of threshold
development levels. The general ordinance in effect tells us that in the view of the local
community, legitimate disputes may be sparked by development changes that breach a stated
threshold-and these disputes must be mediated. Thus, the general ordinance acts as an assertion
of jurisdiction to mediate development disputes.
The piecemeal change is the actual subject of mediation: in acting on an application for, say,
a variance or rezoning, the governmental body is considering a concrete use that breaches the
"disputatiousness" threshold, and it may therefore attempt to mediate disputes that arise. The
piecemeal change thus in a sense actualizes a land regulation, whereas the general regulation is
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changes are treated as mediations, their "dealing" aspects are not an
undesirable aberration but natural parts of the dispute resolution. In
keeping with the open norms of mediation, an appropriate solution is
not always a single answer complying with fixed standards, but rather a
mix of accommodations.2 48  Examples of these wide-ranging
accommodations abound in modem land use practice. A community
might ask a developer to provide park space as a tradeoff for
permission to build a new development, 49 or to preserve a familiar
community landmark in exchange for permission to build at a higher
density;25 0 or the tenants of a low income area, through the local
government as mediator, may negotiate with a highrise developer for
low-income housing to offset the loss of inexpensive residential hotel
space.25' Some of these tradeoffs are controversial, and I will discuss
some tests of their carefulness and fairness below. But they are at least
comprehensible as mediated accommodations.
To be sure, as Lon Fuller has argued, government mediation
differs from the usual form: the government mediator has the authority
merely potential; the tract zoned for "rural residential" use, for example, is usually in a threshold
category that may change the future, but if the tract were rezoned to Planned Unit Development
on the urging of a developer, the new zoning would in effect act as an imprimatur on an actual
long term use of the land. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210
A.2d 325 (1965). Because such a change in status usually precedes an actual development, it is
unlikely to include more than a fraction of a locality's land space or population. The
characteristic sign of the piecemeal change, however, is neither the size of the development nor the
numbers of persons involved, see supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text, but rather the
anticipation of actual development-and this development is at a potentially disputatious level.
As in nuisance law, it is the change to an acutal development or actual use that can precipitate a
land dispute. See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 49, 72-73 (1979).
Some of the plan jurisprudence cases and commentaries have recognized that the piecemeal
change is in effect a license for actual use. See Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139,
171,215 N.W.2d 179, 193 (1974) (Levin, J., concurring); Kelly, Comment on Margolis, Wright and
Yanz, LAND UsE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1982, at 14. There is also an implicit recognition of the
"threshold" or jurisdictional character of general zoning ordinances in some of the litigation on
takings. See infra notes 299-305 and accompanying text. In this litigation courts have insisted
that disputants actually apply for development permission before a takings claim can ripen. See,
e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
The courts' remand for local mediation resembles in some respects modem African courts'
support of local tribal mediation and negotiation processes. See Center, Dispute Settlement and
Dispute Processing in Zambia, in THE DISPUTING PRocEss-LAw IN TEN SocIETIES, supra note
236, at 277.
248. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 52-54, 58-59, 190-94; Gulliver, supra note 239, at 6-10;
Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 237, at 321, 333.
249. See, eg., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (en banc), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971).
250. Kilduff, Aicazar Theater to Fall, San Francisco Chron., July 9, 1982, at 4, col. 2.
251. Id.; telephone interview with S. Cohn, San Francisco North of Market Planning
Coalition (June 14, 1982).
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to impose a solution,2 52 and thus would seem free to favor one side over
another. But this may not make a great deal of difference in practice.
As Melvin Eisenberg points out, even the mediator with a direct
interest in the outcome is expected to hear all parties and come to an
acceptable compromise.2 53
The government mediator has a stake in reaching an
accommodation acceptable to all (thus retaining what Hirschman
might call the "loyalty" of all disputants), and in avoiding both the
pain and cost of overparticipation and the exit of valuable developers
and/or community members.254 Fuller himself, although he stresses
the nondeciding role of the mediator generally,255 discussed a local
official's adjustment of property rights in water as a process involving a
"consultative" form of governmental decisionmaking, indis-
tinguishable from mediation in many respects,256 and departing from
the Austinian concept of law as the exercise of authority.257
At the same time, the local government's ultimate position of
authority does make a difference: some mediations fail to reach
252. Felstiner, Influences, supra note 237, at 69; Fuller, supra note 237, at 314-15.
253. Eisenberg cites as examples the insurance adjuster who mediates claims against his
employer and the architect who mediates disputes between clients and construction contractors.
Eisenberg, supra note 237, at 662-64.
254. On the costs of voice, see A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 23, at 38-40. For an example of the
use of exit by an outsider, see Adams, Hilton Kills Plans for Hotel Tower in Tenderloin, San
Francisco Exam., May 17, 1981, § B, at 1, col. 5 (hotel chain said it would abandon its plans in the
face of what it regarded as excessive demands by city and neighborhood residents for low income
housing).
Ellickson, supra note 4, at 436-38, is particularly concerned that persons without great
political influence, including outsiders, be protected against unfair demands by localities. The
present analysis suggests that the possibility of exit (going to a competing community) gives
considerable leverage to outsiders, including those that might not normally be thought
particularly desirable. See, e.g., Morganthaler, To Keep Their Town Alive, the Residents of
Naturita, Colo., Want a Nuclear Dump, Wall St. J., July 1, 1982, at 19, col. 4; Minsky, In Depressed
Midwest, Two Small To wns Fightfor a Smelly Hog-Slaughtering Plant, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1982, at
27, coL 4. The outsiders who need protection are those for whom exit gives no leverage-
particularly low income groups. Perhaps for this reason low income groups have been the object
of special attention in statutory and judicial injection of regional duties into local land regulation.
See infra note 260. Ellickson's analysis also suggests that exit options in housing can be prevented
by a homeowners' monopoly over residential space. See Ellickson, supra note 4, at 425-30. An
effective homeowners' cartel, however, seems rather unlikely because many persons and
communities would have to act in concert. See Wolfram, The Sale of Development Rights and
Zoning in the Preservation of Open Space: Lindahl Equilibrium and a Case Stud, 57 LAND ECON.
398, 406 (1981).
255. Fuller, supra note 237, at 308, 314-15.
256. Id. at 334-36. See also Danzig & Lowy, supra note 237, at 682-83 (the mediating
function of nominally authoritative regulatory agencies). Fuller, supra note 237, at 337, remarks
that the consultative aspects of the watermaster's duties are analogous to what social scientists
might call "primitive" social ordering, again suggesting that local governmental mediation
processes reflect a far more ancient mode of governance than does The Federalist's intricate
overlapping of checks and balances.
257. Fuller, supra note 237, at 339.
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accommodation, and if that happens a governmental body must act
authoritatively, without securing the assent of all interested parties, and
leaving some party to "lump it."2 58 It is the failed mediation that
appears in the courts, when some party is dissatisfied, and that
necessitates a jurisprudence of mediation, to probe the care and
fairness of the process. How, then, are the courts to assess the
reasonableness of a failed mediation of a piecemeal change? When
should the results be left undisturbed, and a party left dissatisfied?
Conversely, when should the mediation results be overturned? These
are the issues for a mediative jurisprudence, which I address in Part IV.
IV
AN ALTERNATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: PIECEMEAL CHANGES
AS MEDIATION
Local land regulations, including piecemeal changes, must all
meet a variety of substantive requirements in federal and state law.
Thus they must not violate first amendment rights,2 59 they must pro-
vide due process, and they must comply with legislative or judicial
mandates to take on regional responsibilities, particularly those of
helping to care for low income needs.260 But one lesson from plan ju-
risprudence is that even when these larger requirements are met, locally
determined piecemeal changes may still be ill-considered or unfair, and
the courts cannot rely on a traditional notion of legislative "reasonable-
ness," or on Federalist arguments for institutional competence. Al-
though this Article rejects the adjudicative model adopted by plan
jurisprudence, it shares plan jurisprudence's goal: a mediation model
too should strive to assure fairness and due consideration.
The terms "fairness" and "due consideration" both take meaning
from the context in which they arise. We have seen that in a large
legislature these qualities result from a clash of interests leading to tem-
porary stasis. In local piecemeal changes, the meaning of fairness and
due consideration should arise from the elements that legitimize local
government. From the alternate tradition in American political think-
ing, we may identify those elements as participation and withdrawal-
or, in Hirschman's terms, the combination of voice and exit. These
elements should guide a jurisprudence of local mediations toward the
258. Felstiner, Influences, supra note 237, at 81. See also THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAw IN
TEN SocIETIEs, supra note 236, at 9 (distinguishing Felstiner's "lumping it" from Hirschman's
"exit").
259. Eg., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
260. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65580-65589 (West Supp.
1983).
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goals of fairness and due consideration. In this Part, I will develop a
concept of due consideration that depends on participation or voice,
and a concept of fairness that depends on the possibility of exit. In
outlining these concepts I will draw on ideas and comparisons from
plan jurisprudence, but will also look to some recent reform proposals
in land use regulation, especially those stemming from environmental
impact review and from economic analysis.
A. Due Consideration as Voice
Plan jurisprudence abandons the legislative clash of interests as a
guarantor of due consideration, and instead sets forth two questions for
assessing whether a given piecemeal change was adequately consid-
ered. First, it asks whether the change process followed the delibera-
tive processes of a court or quasi-court; second, whether the change
follows from an earlier deliberative process, that is, from the previously
adopted "general plan." A mediation model, unlike plan jurispru-
dence, attempts to assure due consideration through a pattern of
voice-through hearing from interested parties and attempting to ar-
rive at an accommodation acceptable to them within the framework of
larger community norms.
As a number of commentators have noted, mediation has its own
rhythm for working out accommodations, 261 and a court should ask if
the mediation sequence has been followed when it tests whether a re-
sult was duly considered-whether interested parties had enough op-
portunity to participate.262  At least three basic stages can be
delineated: (1) identification of disputants; (2) exploration of issues;
and (3) explanation of outcome.
In plan jurisprudence the stages appear as notice, hearings, and
findings; and while these suggest too close an adherence to a judicial
prototype, a mediative jursiprudence can use and flesh out that proto-
type. But it can also use other modem planning ideas, notably environ-
mental impact analysis.
L Identofcation of Disputants and Sources of Dispute
Disputes over proposed land use changes may not be immediately
obvious, and failure to inquire into latent disputes and to locate poten-
tial disputants may abort the accommodation that mediation should
261. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 121-77; Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 237, at 337-45
(identifying nine steps in the process of environmental mediation).
262. Gulliver notes that professional mediators are conscious that negotiations may break
down when the stages of negotiation are rushed (e.g., union negotiators think a precipitate wage
offer is a trick), and refers to these stages as negotiative due process. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236,
at 175-76.
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create.263 One way to bring out latent disputes is notice to persons pos-
sibly interested in the change. Indeed, the persons who receive notice
are those perceived by the community to have some stake in the piece-
meal change. Plan jurisprudence itself grew out of, inter alia, the older
variance proceedings, where some objectors had too little opportunity
to voice objections, particularly if local boards ignored notice and hear-
ing requirements.2 64 Current enabling statutes and local ordinances re-
quire that piecemeal changes proceed only after notice to interested
groups, and after some hearing to allow them to object.265 Courts have
quite rightly taken these requirements extremely seriously, however
discomforting they may be.2 66
A mediation model suggests that when notice is given and no ob-
jections are raised, the courts have little reason to second-guess a local
board's approval of a piecemeal change, and indeed the presumption
should favor the proposed change.267 If one of the functions of a juris-
prudence of piecemeal changes is to assure "voice" in the sense of a
considered accommodation of differences, in the absence of differences
one seeking change should be able to go forward.
There may, however, be some circumstances in which lack of ob-
jection is not a reliable indicator of general consent. At times many
parties may have an interest, but the interest of any individual may be
weak.268  Land developments whose effects are cumulative or most
likely to be felt in the future often fail to arouse objections strong
263. Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 237, at 320.
264. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 100.214 (Supp. 1978) (zoning change must give notice to
adjacent owners and those across the street). See also Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605,
616-18, 596 P.2d 1134, 1140-41, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 724-25 (1979) (due process requires notice to
those who may suffer "significant" deprivation of property from land use change). Cf. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:55D-63 (West Supp. 1982-83) (amendment protested by 20% of surrounding owners
must be passed by 2/3 supermajority).
266. See, e.g., Grotto v. Little Friends, Inc., 104 Il. App. 3d 105, 432 N.E.2d 634 (1982)
(failure to comply with ordinance's notice requirements deprived board of jurisdiction and nulli-
fied grant of variance or special use permit for a home for autistic children). See also Barrie v.
Kitsap County, 84 Wash. 2d 579, 584-86, 527 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1974) (rezoning invalid since notice
misled readers into thinking rezone was only for purpose of a proposed PUD which was voided by
trial court due to inadequate notice of hearing).
267. See, e.g., Town of Somerset v. County Council, 229 Md. 42, 50, 181 A.2d 671, 675-76
(1962) (absence of complaint from neighbors deemed relevant in making exception from Mary-
land's "change/mistake" rule). For a discussion of Maryland's change/mistake rule, see supra
note 44. Older variance boards apparently also took into account the presence or absence of
objections from neighbors. See supra note 82. Developers continue to attempt to show through
polls the absence of neighborhood objections, and to line up neighborhood supporters. See, e.g.,
Kilduff, Condominiums at Winterland OKd, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 12, 1981, at 17, col. 5.
268. For an analysis of this situation as a more general political problem, see M. OLsoN,
supra note 65.
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enough to raise the full range of potential disputes.2 6 9 Preexisting plans
and studies may reveal such objections, as well as others that absent
disputants might raise.
Modem impact analysis suggests another method for raising po-
tential disputes. In California and elsewhere, the courts have held that
land use change permits are "government projects" effectively requir-
ing some impact review of all discretionary grants of private propos-
als.2 10 Although such rulings have been criticized as extending too far
the idea of "government project,"27' they make more sense where the
procedures for regulatory change take the form of mediated negotia-
tions of disputes. Threshold environmental review (i.e., the determina-
tion whether some proposed change will have a significant impact)
inquires into potential objections when simple notice will fail to dis-
close or deal with them. As the courts have recognized, failure to iden-
tify those objections can short circuit the impact review process-just as
it can hamper mediation.272
2. Exploration of Issues
Plan jurisprudence rightly recognizes that small-scale land
changes require a forum and a process for confronting factual and nor-
mative issues. Quasi-judicial proceedings, however, provide too lim-
ited a range within which the parties can exchange information. The
literature of negotiation and mediation suggests that the confrontation
of issues may take much more varied and vivid forms than can be en-
compassed by judicial proceedings. At the outset, for example, the par-
ties may engage in posturing and name-calling behavior that delineates
the outer extremes of their respective positions.273 This is an expression
of voice certainly familiar in the annals of piecemeal land changes.274
269. See Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 237, at 330-33 (noting that the diffuse character of
environmental harms makes identification of parties more difficult).
270. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1972). See also Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash. App. 410, 618 P.2d 1030 (1980). By
the late 1970's, nineteen states had state versions of environmental impact review, with some ap-
plication to local land regulation. See 1977 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY ANN. REP. 130-
35; see also Pearlman, State Environmental Policy Acts: Local Decision Making and Land Use
Planning, 43 J. INsT. AM. PLANNERS 42, 43, 47 (1977).
271. Hagman, supra note 14, at 47. Hagman also criticizes environmental review for diverg-
ing from the theory behind preplanning, id at 47-49, but appears to view ad hoc regulation as
preferable to preplanning, id at 50.
272. See, e.g., Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980) (EIS invalid
for failure to set forth opposing points of view on social and economic environmental effects).
273. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 135-41.
274. The recent conflict over the massive Portman hotel project on Broadway is a reminder of
the emotionally charged theatrics that can accompany individual development disputes. See
Kakutani, Portman Hotel- Broadway is a House Divided, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1982, § 2, at I, col.
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In the later stages of negotiation the parties may construct "bids" or
packages of solutions.275 These confrontations and explorations assist
a successful, mutually acceptable solution; but they are certainly not
suitable for a courtlike process of direct and cross-examination.
Other planning and regulatory processes, however, further the ex-
change of information. Hearings, for example, are a standard require-
ment in many land use changes. And here too, environmental impact
review may be extremely helpful in airing issues. The stated purposes
of these reviews, aside from the substantive goal of preserving the neb-
ulously defined "environment," are essentially procedural: to publicize
issues, to draw in interested parties, to examine alternative solutions,
and to satisfy the public that the issues have been fully explored.276
Just as important, they give interested persons a sense of participation
in the decision, either personally or through the auspices of like-
minded others.
In a larger sense, voice in the form of environmental review exem-
plifies what Richard Stewart calls "interest representation. 27 7 Interest
representation proposals normally attempt to counteract the "capture"
of the regulators by the regulated interest;2 78 in the land use area, "cap-
ture" arguments usually refer to the undue influence on the local gov-
ernment that developers and real estate interests may exercise to the
exclusion of other interested citizens, 279 although the developers may
regard the local council as the "captive" of an implacably antidevelop-
ment majority.280
Interest representation and particularly impact review have been
criticized for merely transposing "capture" from the regulated interests
to other partisan and self-appointed "public interest" groups, 28 I and for
275. P. GULLIVER, supra note 236, at 147-48; Gulliver, supra note 239, at 13-14. Such bids or
packages are also familiar in the land use area. In the Portman project imbroglio, for example,
opponents of the project came up with an alternative design that might save some old theaters.
See Kakutani, supra note 274.
276. See, ag., No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr.
34 (1974). For the "essentially procedural" language, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
277. Stewart, supra note 16, at 1760.
278. Id. at 1682-83, 1713; see also Sabatier, supra note 130, at 302-06.
279. See, e.g., Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
280. See, e.g., Marmah, Inc. v. Town of Greenwich, 176 Conn. 116, 405 A.2d 63 (1978).
281. Stewart, supra note 16, at 1763-64. Henderson and Pearson raise a related objection to
environmental impact review-that it is an effort to appropriate expert skills for goals to which the
experts may be opposed. Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies:
The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429, 1456-62 (1978). The reluctant
expert has a motive to act evenhandedly, however, in a mediation context in which the partici-
pants can threaten exit or voice. For analogous controls on a nonimpartial judge, see Verkuil,
supra note 144, at 788-89.
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causing delay and expense that verges on deadlock.282 But in a local
setting the problems of incompleteness and paralysis may be less signif-
icant than they are for the "extended republic" and its vast bureau-
cracy.28 3 "Capture" itself may be less threatening in local mediation
where even partisan authorities can be restrained by the threats of
voice and exit-that is, the threats that the disputants may either pack
the hearing room, or pull their business out of town altogether.284
Then too, the local community's smaller size narrows the range of in-
terest groups that may intervene, thus leaving less opportunity for dom-
ination by the self-appointed guardians, or for the interminable delay
and expense that accompany an effort to hear too many points of view.
In any event, some delay may well be useful to a local decision.
For one thing, it prevents rash decisions about land uses-decisions
whose consequences will last a long time. In a sense, the delay is like
that which accompanies a clash of interests in a larger legislature: both
prevent hasty decisions that might overlook a larger common good.
Moreover, the seemingly wasteful noise and repetition of impact
review may have other uses. Patient collection of views, even if they
are repetitious, serves a "venting" function that ultimately helps the
disputants to accept a decision.285 While law-and-economics critiques
rightly point out that the costs of process may outweigh the benefits in
results, 2 6 a lack of voice also carries real costs, however difficult they
may be to quantify. Information leading to more lasting or indeed
more efficient accommodations may be lost;287 and lacking a way to
measure the relative costs of environmental effects, 288 we may depend
primarily on voice to keep us informed of costs and benefits. Then too,
without voice, those defeated in final resolution may begrudge the short
shrift they received and may be lost to useful civic participation in the
future.289 On a less idealistic note, disgruntled losers may also liti-
gate-at costs even higher than those of mediation.29
A mediation model thus puts interest representation proposals to
282. Stewart, supra note 16, at 1770.
283. On the impact of interest group fragmentation at the federal level, see D. WALKER, supra
note 57, at 227-46.
284. See supra notes 253-54 & 281.
285. For an older suggestion of this "venting" function ("catharsis") in extended public hear-
ings on land use issues, see Goldston & Scheuer, supra note 76, at 255. See also C. PEIN, EVERY-
THING IN ITS PLACE 183-84 (1977). But see L. LAKE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 69-71 (1982).
286. Ellickson, supra note 16, at 699; Kmiec, Deregulation, supra note 15, at 46-49.
287. A. HiRsCHMAN, supra note 23, at 26; Danzig & Lowy, supra note 237, at 679.
288. Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1402-10
(198 1);see also Pear, Fiscal Plans Bear the Telltale Signs of Cost BenetAnalysis, N.Y. Times, Feb.
14, 1982, § 4, at 2, col. I (criticizing the manipulability of cost-benefit analysis in "pricing" envi-
ronmental costs).
289. Danzig & Lowy, supra note 237, at 678-81.
290. Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 237, at 315-16.
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good use at the local level, employing them to make voice effective.
These proposals suggest the value of voice in mediation: These tech-
niques expand issues and give time for a range of arguments and explo-
rations of the dispute, even when those explorations are emotionally
charged. Standard planning devices too can give evidence of efforts to
expand issues--the hearings, the reports and so on. But again, we
should not be misled (as some courts have been) by a jurisprudence
that fixes merely on the formal presence of a plan and plan consistency;
formal devices may impede an exploration of issues rather than assure
it. 2 91
3. Explanation
Plan jurisprudence calls for standards and records showing in spe-
cific form two general features common to dispute resolution methods:
first, the resolution should be based on norms; and second, some disclo-
sure must be made of the relationship between the relevant norms and
the actual conclusion.
Plan jurisprudence, however, suggests that a record should contain
only matters relevant to fixed preexisting standards rather than the
free-form discussions in land changes, in which disputants refer to a
wide variety of policy considerations and to tradeoffs among them.
Moreover, if the "standard" is a vague or inconsistent plan, a mere
reference to it may conceal rather than disclose the normative bases for
a specific decision.292
A mediation model of land changes recognizes the need for expla-
nation, and suggests a different approach to normative disclosure. Ac-
knowledging that not all norms can be satisfied at once, and that some
may have to be weighed against others, a mediative approach would
require that norms and tradeoffs be disclosed and explained case-by-
case. Some standard planning techniques encourage a local body to do
this. Findings may help. Impact analysis is especially appropriate for
such disclosure, since it involves not only an issue-expanding review
process, 293 but also an ultimate explanation of norms and tradeoffs in
an impact statement.
Explanation furthers due consideration in two ways. First, it rein-
forces and encourages an exploration of issues and potential accommo-
291. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
292. In a recent dispute in San Francisco, for example, the neighbors' opposition to a pro-
posed five-house development centered on the uprooting of a redwood grove. The planning
board, after much vacillation about the fate of the trees, rejected the proposal on the ground that it
did not conform to the city's master plan-at best an opaque "explanation" and one that has little
to do with the main issue in the dispute. Hou, Developer Loses To the Neighbors in Paci c Heights,
San Francisco Chron., Oct. 9, 1981, at 32, col. 1.
293. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
19831
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dations; the very fact that decisionmakers have to explain outcomes
may encourage them to think of alternatives and mitigations. 94 Sec-
ond, explanation ultimately helps to reconcile the parties. Some per-
sons in a mediation may lose in whole or in part-developers may have
to put shrubs around the shopping center; the neighbors may have to
put up with the shopping center itself. But they all may be at least
partially mollified if they know the reasons; like the opportunity for
"venting," explanation treats seriously the objections of those who ulti-
mately have to acquiesce in the outcome.2 95
In sum, in inquiring whether a piecemeal land change was duly
considered, a court should focus on voice in mediation and ask whether
the local body went through the steps of identifying disputants, explor-
ing issues, and explaining results. But doubts about piecemeal changes
do not concern only due consideration or voice. Even when a local
body goes through the steps of voice we may still think that the result is
unfair to an individual. In the next Section, I turn to the meaning of
fairness in local mediation.
B. Fairness and Exit
What does it mean to say that a governmental body has acted
fairly? Clearly, fairness means different things in different contexts.
In a large legislative body, fairness means partial satisfaction
through coalition-building; over time, all parties may participate in a
294. See Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also
Verkuil, supra note 144, at 791.
295. Felstiner, Influences,supra note 237, at 81. These functions of explanation help to clarify
one of the perennial difficulties with piecemeal changes through referendum. Courts ruling
against these popular votes have generally cited a variety of lapses in plebiscitary decisionmaking,
including both lapses of exploration (e.g., the public's inability to hold hearings and go through
reports) and explanation (e.g., the public's inability to make records and findings). See supra
notes 110-11 & 119-22. On the other hand, courts upholding such plebiscites have adverted by
and large only to matters of exploration: the highly public debate over the issues, and the oppor-
tunity of all parties to persuade the voters. See, e.g., Amel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal.
3d 511, 524, 620 P.2d 565, 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 912 (1980); Meridian Dev. Co. v. Edison
Township, 91 N.J. Super. 310, 315, 220 A.2d 121, 124 (1966), quoted in Margolis v. District Court,
638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 1981).
These defenses of plebiscitary methods neglect one aspect of exploration--the packaging and
testing of alternatives and compromises that are virtually impossible in popular votes-and they
entirely fail to deal with the absence of explanation of the outcome. Since their modern inception
in the mid-19th century, plebiscites have been notably blank as to normative disclosure; the yes-
or-no vote may be based on one or more of a number of considerations, and not knowing which
was decisive only feeds fears that improper motives lay behind a vote. See, e.g., Sager, supra note
119, at 1411-15. The lapses of exploration and explanation point to a more fundamental problem
in plebiscitary methods: these decisions, as win-or-lose determinations, are more comparable to
judicial decisions than to either mediation or legislation, and therefore mediative voice must fail.
One cannot completely rule out the possibility of an adequately explored or explained plebiscitory
decision on a piecemeal land change, but the presumption would be against such decisions in a
mediation model.
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majority, and satisfy at least some of their desires. 96 Locally, these
coalition-building assurances are unreliable. But litigation and com-
mentary about local land regulation suggest that there are some con-
cepts of fairness here too. Concepts of fairness, for example, are
apparent in charges that local actions "take" private property, or that a
community is violating its own stated plan, or that its regulations
would be more equitable if they copied the private market.
In sorting out these meanings and how they apply to local govern-
ment, contract analysis of fairness is helpful. According to contract
analysis, there are at least two aspects to fairness: fairness of result
(that is, as a restraint on distribution, or more particularly on redistri-
bution), and fairness in the bargaining arrangements (that is, as a re-
straint on surprise or duress).297
In the following subsections, I will discuss the various meanings of
fairness in piecemeal changes from both of these contract perspectives,
but will argue that of the two, the latter is more important in local land
regulations. It is also more interesting because on close analysis, the
idea of fairness as "no surprise" brings us back to Hirschman's concept
of exit: the party who is not surprised, and who can choose to avoid the
deal, is the party who can ultimately exit.
. Fairness as a Distributive or Redistributive Restraint
The use of "takings" clauses of federal and state constitutions is a
major litigative vehicle for checking unfairness in local land regulation.
Usually, the party raising the takings claim is the disappointed project
initiator; neighbors or others opposing a development, because of their
more diffuse and less direct property interests, have less frequently
mounted such claims.2 98
The root of a takings claim is that some public act has placed on
an individual or group too high a proportion of some burden-a bur-
den which all (or at least some larger portion of the community) should
296. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
297. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 752-54 (1982);
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 486-87
(1967). Eisenberg argues, however, that redistributive and bargaining fairness overlap. On bar-
gaining fairness as a limit on redistribution, see Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REv.
1587, 1633 (1981).
298. Boilerplate land use law concedes to neighbors no vested property rights in existing zon-
ing. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 10, § 4.27. While this rule is relaxed to the extent of allowing
standing to neighbors to contest changes, they have no takings claim, because they have had no
property rights "taken." As to project initiators, they appear to bring takings claims more fre-
quently than the track record would suggest is appropriate, perhaps suggesting that these claims
are used in part as bargaining moves to induce further negotiation. But for recent developments
pointing to a sharper look at local practices under takings doctrine, see infra note 305.
1983]
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bear.299 Takings doctrine is thus essentially a limitation on redistribu-
tions or redefinitions of property rights that harm particular individu-
als. Actual physical invasions of property, perhaps because these are
such obvious takings, have been relatively closely reviewed.3"' But
physically noninvasive regulations may also "take" property, and tradi-
tional takings cases suggest that these can be justified only when they
are in effect nonredistributive-e.g., when they are offset by some re-
ciprocal benefits to the party from whom property was taken, or when
the use regulated is so noxious that the party complaining of a taking
never had a right to it in the first place.30 1
These older tests, however, have never been strictly applied to lo-
cal land decisions.30 2 Moreover, the current federal formulation for
cases where a noninvasive regulation is challenged as a taking-that
the party be seriously disturbed in his "investment-backed expecta-
tions' 3°3 and be deprived not just of some portion of his use, but of any
and all "reasonable beneficial use" 3 -- implies that local readjustments
of land controls may be upheld unless their redistributive effects are
egregious.305 Thus, federal takings doctrine, while it acts as some sub-
299. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The determination that
governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large,
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
interest."); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("[T]he question at bottom
is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall."). See also Mandelker, Inverse Condem-
nation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Respons'bilip, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3, 8. The literature
on "taking" has been voluminous. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CON-
STITUTION (1977), reviewed in Epstein, Book Review, 30 STAN. L. REy. 635 (1978); Costonis,
"Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotesfor the Taking Impasse in Land
Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Michelman, supra note 3; Sax, Takings, Pri-
vate Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
300. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982); see also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Michelman, supra note 3, at 1228, 1233.
301. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
302. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v."
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Maher v. City of
New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976); Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
303. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 136 (1978); see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 83-84 (1980); Michelman, supra note 3, at 1233.
304. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978); see also Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980).
305. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378
(1979) (en banc), af'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the California Supreme Court appeared to define a
taking as an action that deprived the landowner of "substantially all reasonable use of his prop-
erty." The United States Supreme Court, however, has given some signals that in the future it
may look more critically at the distributive effect of local regulations, either as takings, see, e.g.,
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651-53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); see also Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981), or as violations of antitrust law, see
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The effect of these more
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stantive check on the fairness of local land decisions, sets a very wide
horizon within which those decisions can adjust property claims.
The neighbors' counterpart to a takings claim appeals to the local-
ity's plan. This appeal to locally defined standards has traditionally
come not from the proponent of change, but from the neighbors who
opposed some deal that was in fact struck. Indeed, it was precisely
these neighbors' claims that there should be some "public interest" test
of variances and zoning changes that led the courts to the plan jurispru-
dence, and that brought the courts to see the locality's own plan as a
substantive standard against which to measure the individual bar-
gain.30 6 I have recounted at length the difficulties of relying on the
advance plan; most relevant here are the facts that the plan itself may
be vague or unfairly redistributive. 07 Thus, a "general plan" is a high-
ly dubious limitation on unfair redistribution.
In sum, given the way these doctrines have developed, the an-
tiredistributive concept of fairness provides only very loose checks on
local government discretion. Takings claims leave very wide latitude to
the locality; and local general plans are too easily manipulable to act as
serious limitations.
But plan jurisprudence does direct our attention to a second per-
spective on fairness. In holding that land changes should be based on
some earlier defined local standards, plan jurisprudence uses predict-
ability, or protection from surprise, as another criterion of fairness.
A somewhat similar movement-from fairness as a substantive
check on redistribution to fairness as largely procedural predictabil-
ity--emerges from the economic analysis in some of the academic land
use reform proposals. The next subsection focuses on these proposals.
2. From Redistributive Fairness to Predictability. Lessons from the
Market-Mimicking Model
Market-mimicking proposals generally take the position that land
regulation outcomes should as closely as possible track the decisions
that, but for "market failure," would be made through private transac-
tions.3" 8 The chief object of these proposals is to maintain (or restore)
stringent tests on land controls is as yet uncertain. Compare, e.g., Mason City Center Assocs. v.
City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (no state-action antitrust immunity for
city), a'd, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982), with Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,
532 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (immunity extended to city).
306. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development, supra note 104, at 73-77.
307. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. For a plan involving very substantial
reduction in uses available to the owner, see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981).
308. For a general discussion of market-mimicking proposals, see Stewart, supra note 16, at
1702-11.
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the efficient allocation of goods normally associated with market trans-
actions, and many proponents take a skeptical stance toward expansive
dispute settlement procedures, believing that these could be so costly as
to produce inefficient net results. 30 9
But market-mimicking models nevertheless do have some surpris-
ing similarities to a mediation model. Their stress on exchange sug-
gests that the land use change may encompass various types of quid pro
quo, and thus implies that disputes may be settled with different pack-
ages of accommodations, rather than through the all-or-nothing out-
come reached by a court applying a given standard. More important
for present purposes, market proposals have some important lessons
about the meaning of fairness in making piecemeal changes. Although
these proposals appear to treat fairness as a brake on redistribution, on
closer analysis their concept of fairness is protection from surprise.
At first glance, market-mimicking proposals seem to deal with
fairness, if at all, as a substantive limitation on redistribution.10 This
is because market transactions-the model to be emulated-involve
trading rather than sheer wealth transfer. In economic models, there-
fore, regulations require us where possible to pay for what we want
rather than allowing us simply to take it from others. For example,
Robert Ellickson has suggested that piecemeal changes be regulated by
an expanded version of traditional nuisance law; his proposed local
"nuisance boards" would provide a public forum for working out pri-
vate control of the adverse "spillover" effects of individual land uses.
As in market transactions, individuals would be required to signal their
preferences and pay accordingly.31' Other scholars have formulated
land regulations that would act as a different kind of market substitute:
regulations would serve as brokerage devices, to charge and compen-
sate for the otherwise unadjusted "wipeouts" and "windfalls" that so
often accompany land development.3 12
309. Kmiec thinks that the greatest efficiency gains in his own reform proposal come from
procedural simplification, whereby neighbors are precluded from participation in individual land
decisions. Kmiec, Deregulation, supra note 15, at 83, 129. See also Ellickson, supra note 16, at
697-99; Huffman & Plantico, Toward a Theory of Land Use Planning: Lessons from Oregon, 14
LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1979) (criticizing Oregon's land planning scheme).
310. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 16, at 699. However, al efficient regulation in the
Kaldor-Hicks sense (benefits to "gainer" exceed costs to "losers") need not be fair in a distribu-
tional sense, since an individual could lose a great deal even if his costs were outweighed by the
public's benefits. Pareto efficiency, by contrast, finds a situation efficient if no one can be made
better off unless someone else is made worse off. For an exposition of these concepts of efficiency,
see R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 6, at 63-64. For possible divergences between distri-
butional fairness and efficiency, see Michelman, supra note 3, at 1234-35; Weisbrod, supra note 3,
at 11.
311. Ellickson, supra note 16.
312. See generally D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (1978).
Kmiec also develops a land use reform proposal based on value recapture. See Kmiec, Deregula-
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Municipalities have begun to apply market-mimicking theory in
their own ways, arguing that various new developments have external
costs to the public, and that fairness requires that these costs should be
offset by "amenities" or charges imposed on the new development to
benefit the existing community. 3  Thus, some San Francisco officials,
for example, hope to require new office developers to build housing
and perhaps even to pay transportation fees for the office workers at-
tracted to new office structures, or to provide art work and mini-parks
to compensate for the shadows and gloom their structures will cre-
ate.3 14 In variations on this theme, some municipalities have "paid"
land owners for the maintenance of uneconomic historic structures or
open spaces, or for the development of low income housing, by permit-
ting these owners to exceed bulk limitations on their other
properties.315
City governments find such devices attractive because they may
eliminate or reduce their own expenditures for public amenities; but
developers have greeted such devices with outrage.316 This reaction
should at least suggest that fairness problems in local land use decisions
are not completely solved by using the market-mimicking approach.
First, market models may neglect considerations of fairness alto-
gether, since they may seek only efficient solutions. An efficient regula-
lion, supra note 15, at 115-29. See also Baker, Recovering Privately and Fublily Conferred Wind-
falls-An Exploratory Essay, 13 URB. LAW. vii (1981); Note, Efficient Land Use and the
Internalization of Benefcial Spillovers: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 31 STAN. L. Rav. 457
(1979).
313. See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971);
Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d 486, 141 Cal. Rptr. 36
(1977); City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 312 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
rev'don other grounds, 329 So. 2d 314 (1976); Board of Educ. v. Surety Developers, Inc., 63 Ill. 2d
193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975). But see West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224
A.2d 1 (1966). For a critical view of such charges, see Ellickson, supra note 4.
314. Kilduff, Hearing Today on Muni Tax, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 15, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
For other amenities that may be required of downtown builders, see Hsu, Firm Gives Money for
S.F Housing, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 25, 1981, at 7, col. 4; Kilduff, How Planners Get Hous-
ing From Highrises, San Francisco Chron., Apr. 10, 1981, at 7, col. 1; KilduffAlcazar Theater to
Fall, San Francisco Chron., July 9, 1982, at 4, col. 2 (condominium project approved after devel-
oper negotiated with local low income groups, agreed to retain historic theater facade, fund some
low income housing, and provide funds for neighborhood theater programs). For similar plans in
New York, see Horsley, Radical Midtown Zoning Overhaul, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, § 1, at 1,
col. 1. For San Francisco's earlier versions of "bonus zoning," see N. MARCUS & M. GROVES,
THE NEw ZONING 139 (1970).
315. See, e.g., Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973); Danels & MagidaApplication of Transfer of Development Rights to Inner City Communities:
A Proposed Municipal Land Use Rights Act, 11 URn. LAW. 124 (1979); Ellickson, supra note 15, at
1180-81. Ellickson is critical of these "bonus" schemes, as are a number of other writers; see, e.g.,
F. JAMES & D. GALE, ZONING FOR SALE (1977).
316. See, e-g., Kilduff, supra note 314 (downtown developers angry over proposed transit fee,
purportedly to set off additional transit needs created by downtown development).
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tion, when defined as one in which benefits outweigh costs, may
involve unfair redistribution, since the individual may lose a great deal
even though his costs are outweighed by social benefits.3"7 Perhaps
more fundamental is an ambiguity about the meaning of the external
harms that market-mimicking regulations supposedly address. Propo-
nents of various market models concede the difficulties of defining "ex-
ternality; '318 and the pricing of external harms or benefits that, by
definition, never appear in a market, is an intractable difficulty of the
market-mimicking approach.31 9 So long as the local governmental
body decides the definition and price of harms and benefits, it can ma-
nipulate the market model and exploit the potential for abuse that led
to reform proposals in the first place.
Some of these proposals, however, do suggest a different method
of defining harms and benefits, one using ordinary language under-
standings of "external harms" and "neighborliness. ' 320 But here too,
we may have to fall back on the ordinary language of the very commu-
nity whose practices we are attempting to test for fairness. 32' Thus,
whereas plan jurisprudence would measure the individual piecemeal
change against the community's foreordained plan, market-mimicking
proposals would measure it against the community's ordinary under-
standing of harms and benefits. This hardly advances a counter-redis-
tributive concept of fairness. Planning critics charge that the
community's plan may overburden (or underbenefit) certain groups, 322
but the community's ordinary language or ordinary practice may have
the same undesirable effects.
317. See supra note 310.
318. See, eg., Huffman & Plantico,supra note 309;see also Pelham, supra note 12 (criticizing
as unrealistic proposals for regional cost-benefit analysis of local land use decisions).
319. Coleman, The Economic Anaolsis ofLaw, 24 NoMos: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE
LAW 83, 87-88, 98 (1982). Sagoff, supra note 288, at 1402-10. See also Susskind & Weinstein,
supra note 237, at 329-30. Richard Posner is unimpressed with the difficulties of pricing goods
outside the market, and remarks that judges can make reasonable assessments of the value of such
goods. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 61-62 (1981). The example given (a smashed bag
of oranges) presents the problem in its simplest form, however. For a discussion of the "intracta-
ble" difficulties of measuring something much less tangible-the desire of a crime victim for pun-
ishment of the wrongdoer-see id. at 211. In any event, if judges do assess the value of matters
outside the market, a question must arise about the basis for their assessments. Perhaps that basis
is in ordinary language; see infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
320. Ellickson, supra note 16, at 728-33.
321. For an application of the "contemporary community standards" in the definition of ob-
scenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (5-4 decision), Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974) (relevant community is local), and Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61 (1981) (striking down fiat bans on "live entertainment" as overbroad). Ellickson
would widen the "community" defining "neighborly" or "normal" land uses to a metropolitan
community. See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 732. See also id. at 762-64 (proposing metropolitan
boards to set standards); Note, supra note 312, at 472-74 (proposing that administrative boards
assess externalities at standard rates, without specifying nature of community setting standards).
322. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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The ordinary language argument, however, does help ensure fair-
ness defined as protection from surprise. One fundamental reason for
using ordinary language as a guide to deciding property disputes is that
an average person knows what to expect from ordinary language, since
it is unlikely to change by dramatic leaps, though it may change
gradually.
Ordinary language then, can be a guide safeguarding the individ-
ual against unpredictable or anomalous changes. If, despite the com-
munity's prior assurances to the contrary, a lot owner's property is
effectively "downzoned" so that open space is the only use allowed,
and this is done by an ordinance applied to no other lot in the vicinity,
the owner may rightly claim unfair surprise.3  Or, if a low income
housing developer is denied a zoning change only because the neigh-
bors fear minority newcomers, he may certainly claim unfair surprise
in today's civil rights climate.32 4
Thus, the ordinary language standard suggests that fairness is a
matter of predictability. General planning and the new plan consis-
tency requirements supposedly do protect predictability, 325 but it can
easily be undermined by vague or changeable plans. In a mediation
model, the analog to ordinary language or ordinary practice is not so
much the general plan as the community's establishedpattern of han-
dling piecemeal changes. This pattern, as Jan Krasnowiecki has sug-
gested, may be more informative than a "general plan" about a
community's probable land decisions.326
If fairness depends on predictability, then planning is desirable, as
plan jurisprudence holds. Planning documents, particularly vague and
general end-state plans, may not be particularly good bases for predic-
tion. But planning in the more modem conception-that is, as continu-
ous and careful reevaluation of resources and goals-may enhance
predictability in the way that ordinary language or ordinary patterns of
change do. Rolling planning activities protect citizens from sharp dis-
continuities in land use control and can give notice to interested parties
about the possible piecemeal changes affecting a given property. In-
deed, planning itself may improve if the courts see plans not as talis-
mans to which regulations must conform, but simply as evidence of
323. Gibson v. Village of Wilmette, 97 Il1. App. 3d 1033, 425 N.E.2d 434 (1981).
324. The court ruled that there was no "taking" under these circumstances in Ohoopee Land
Dev. Corp. v. Mayor of Wrightsville, 248 Ga. 96, 281.S.E.2d 529 (1981). Under the foreseeability
test proposed here, this case would probably have come out the opposite way, quite aside from
possible civil rights violations.
325. Haar, The Master Plan, supra note 100, at 365-66.
326. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development, supra note 104, at 68. See also Krasnowiecki,
Zoning Litigation-How To VWin Without Really Losing, 1976 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 1, 4.
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foreseeability. Such treatment encourages communities to think ahead
and to publicize their intentions, and in fact to weigh how they expect
to develop. If they do so, the greater predictability of current media-
tions can rebut the charge of unfairness.
For example, imagine the developer who is pressed to provide a
downtown "pocket park" or a subway entrance to mitigate his build-
ing's effect on sunlight and traffic conditions. He is forewarned that
such a quid pro quo may be asked if planning studies or impact analy-
ses have shown that the community has studied its sunlight and traffic
congestion conditions and has thus signaled its concern with the sub-
ject, and if its planning studies have identified benefits that might be a
part of a negotiated package.327 As one developer commented, he
might expect to provide such a quid pro quo as a cost of doing business
in the city.3 28
But there is still another step entailed in using predictability as a
basis for fairness. One protects oneself against the predictable evil by
not participating in the risky venture, by not purchasing the property
that needs the seldom-granted zoning change. It is precisely because
exit is relatively available at local governmental levels that predictabil-
ity can test fairness. While predictability makes exit possible, the likeli-
hood of exit acts as a check on local bodies: they will want to act
reasonably so that potential developers will not decide that any invest-
ment in their community is simply too costly. As one law and econom-
ics commentator has observed, land use changes occur in a climate of
regulation, and if developers are aware of the climate they can account
for it in private arrangements; it is only the unforeseen governmental
action that is unfair.329 Implicit in this view, of course, is the presuppo-
327. See Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 186 Conn. 466, 442 A.2d
65 (1982) (stressing earlier planning activities that gave subdivider warning of the possible re-
quirements and upholding dedications required of subdivider). For planning documents on an
array of possible conditions for downtown development, see Adams, Limiting the Growth of Down-
town High-rises, San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 15, 1981, § 2A, at 1, col. 1 (discussing the City
Planning Department's plan, Guiding Downtown Development). For similar proposals in New
York, see DEP'T OF Crry PLANNING, CITY OF N.Y., MIDTOWN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 53-79
(1980).
328. Kilduff, Developer Gives $1 Million to S.F., San Francisco Chron., Aug. 18, 1981, at 3,
col. 5. Developers now routinely design condominiums along with office space in San Francisco.
See Planning Commission OKs "tioneer'Highrise, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 29, 1982, at 5, col. 4.
They also apparently reckon with the possibility of concessions to low income housing provision
and preservation of historic properties. Telephone interview with S. Colim, San Francisco North
of Market Planning Coalition (May 14, 1982).
329. Roberts, An Appropriate Economic Model of JudicialReview of Suburban Growth Control,
55 IND. LJ. 441, 462-63 (1980). See also Whittaker v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 179 Conn. 650, 661,
427 A.2d 1346, 1352 (1980) ("One who chooses to engage in subdividing land by-that decision thus
chooses also to be subject to the reasonable regulation of the local planning commission.").
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sition that one who does not like what is going on may leave or never
enter the market in the first place.
Opportunity for exit is not perfectly available even locally33 L-nor
need it be, since if exit is too easy, participation as a corrective device
for community self-education becomes less likely. Nor is the opportu-
nity for exit evenly distributed.331 Outsiders can more easily threaten
to "exit" and take their business elsewhere,332 while homeowners and
poorer neighborhoods sometimes participate more readily: psychic in-
vestments or lack of resources keep these residents from easy exit.
Here, of course, voice overlaps with exit, since voice also gives at least
limited protection to those who cannot easily exit. But especially where
exit is possible, predictability can be a meaningful test of fairness for a
jurisprudence of piecemeal changes, as the courts have sometimes
recognized.333
Predictability is not an onerous requirement. There are ways com-
munities can make piecemeal changes predictable for those who may
be affected: they can follow past patterns of change and accommoda-
tion; they can explain those patterns over time through impact reviews;
they can explain intended deviations or major policy shifts through
continuous reevaluative planning. It is such indicia of predictability
that the courts should use to test the fairness of any given piecemeal
change so as to ascertain whether the parties could have protected
themselves by exit, or perhaps, by timely voice.
Thus, just as the courts should look for voice in testing due consid-
eration, so they should look for exit in testing for fairness-most nota-
330. This has been pointed out by Tiebout's critics, who questioned his assumption that resi-
dents could move easily among communities. See, e.g., Buchanan & Goetz, Efficiency Limits of
Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. EcoN. 25 (1972).
331. On the effects of unequal opportunities for exit at different income levels, see Grubb,
supra note 230, at 24, 34. Hirschman discusses a variety of other "loyalty" barriers to exit, includ-
ing family or community ties. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 23, at 76.
332. See supra note 254.
333. The obvious application is to the land speculator who purchases in the hope of getting
permission to undertake some change in existing uses. Courts have also taken predictability and
foreseeability into account in evaluating variances, particularly in denying them to those who
purchase with knowledge of the problematic character of a lot. See Note, The Ad Hominem
Element in the Treatment of Zoning Problems, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 992, 993-97 (1961). But here the
courts may have been insufficiently sensitive to the different opportunities for exit; these decisions
may harm the vendor (who cannot sell and who does not want a variance himself, even though he
may be entitled to one). Nevertheless, the argument against variances for those who purchase
with notice is still made. See, e.g., Negin v. Board of Bldg. & Zoning Appeals, 69 Ohio St. 2d 492,
499-500, 433 N.E.2d 165, 170-71 (1982) (per curiam) (Krupansky, J., dissenting); cf. Parkway
Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Norridge, 106 Ill. App. 3d 350, 353, 436 N.E.2d 9, 12 (1982) (those
who purchase with knowledge of limitations are in unfavorable position to challenge validity of
limitations, although they may prevail where there is no harm to public or surrounding proper-
ties). For permutations on the rules concerning purchasers who seek variances, see Bryden, supra
note 10, at 307.
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bly, for signs that a change was predictable, giving the parties an
opportunity to get out of harm's way if they did not wish to bear the
risks.
CONCLUSION: WHY LOCAL LAND USE CONTROL?
In this Article I have attempted to link piecemeal land changes to
a non-Federalist "alternative tradition" in American political thinking.
This tradition legitimizes local decisionmaking by reference to the
smallness of local communities, in contradistinction to the largeness of
The Federalist's extended republic. It suggests that the proper mode of
ensuring reasonableness, in the sense of fairness and due consideration,
is the refinement of the local potential for exit and voice, rather than
the attempt to make a local body act like a court when it cannot act like
a large legislature. As the elements of a new reasonableness standard,
the test of due consideration should be based on popular participation
in the steps of a mediation process, and the test of fairness should be
based on predictability-the latter test made effective particularly by
the opportunity for exit.
Still remaining is the question of why we so frequently entrust
land use decisions to local governments or even to neighborhoods, 334
where fairness and due consideration cannot rest on Federalist assur-
ances, but must rely on opportunities for exit and voice. Although this
subject cannot be fully explored here, if we examine the alternative
tradition, we may find some tentative answers.
A standard economic argument for land use regulation is that it
prevents adverse "spillover" effects of individual uses, and promotes
beneficial uses where individual transactions would not.33 Since we
have no good way to price the "spillovers" of property uses, 336 the only
tolerable solution may be to permit communities to make their own
property adjustments, so long as the adjustments are carefully consid-
ered and reasonably foreseeable by individuals who can to some degree
choose among communities.
Moreover, it may well be that despite all the official boilerplate of
334. Nelson notes the preference among some citizens for tight neighborhood controls. See
Nelson, supra note 15, at 725, 728. For some neighborhood-based regulations, see SAN FRAN-
CISCO, CAL., CITY PLANNING CODE §§ 235-240.3 (1979) (neighborhood "special districts"); U.S.
Housing and Community Development Act, 43 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(6) (1976 & Supp. 111 1979)
(neighborhood participation in local community development programs); Rose, supra note 186
(neighborhood control in historic districts).
335. See, e.g., Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 183, 209-11 (1972); Huffman & Plantico, supra note 309, at 16-30; Moore, Why.411ow
Planners to Do What They Do? A Just6cationfrom Economic Theory, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS
387, 390-97 (1978); Tarlock,An Economic Analysis of Direct Voter Particpation in Zoning Change,
1 J. ENVTL. L. 31, 34 (1980).
336. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
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health and safety (and recently, environmental protection) in the pre-
ambles of land use controls, the most serious spillovers or externalities
of land use fall within the vague field of aesthetics: the way the area
looks, sounds, feels, smells. 337 Reactions to matters of the senses are
likely to be limited in physical range; such externalities are most deeply
felt within the neighborhood. But there they may be felt very deeply
indeed, for the look of the place may affect the social self-definition of
the residents and their sense of control of their lives.338 Hence, the
economists might say, if land use externalities are primarily matters of
aesthetics, then we might expect a constant pressure for regulation at
the local level.
But the alternative tradition suggests another reason why these
controls are almost always placed in local hands. The symbolic mean-
ings and values attached to aesthetic tastes vary enormously and are
based on polycentric criteria not easily standardized.339 It may be that
we do not want to entrust decisions about such matters to coalition-
building legislatures at all, preferring these decisions to be made by
people we trust because we have chosen to live with them, and because
we sense our influence on them.34 Moreover, we may prefer that such
decisions be made individually. It is not enough to trade a shopping
center here for an apartment project there; we want individual consid-
eration of each on its merits. This may also be true of education, the
other major subject Americans regularly entrust to local units: we are
not willing to make decisions about our children through coalition
building, but rather we want particularized consideration of individual
proposals by people whose judgment we trust and whom we can influ-
ence through consultation. These are decisions where quality matters
especially, and we want them made where we have voice-or the ulti-
mate possibility of exit.
All this is no more than speculation. But if there is anything to it,
337. See, e.g., R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 4-5; K. LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF
THE CITY 2-3 (1960).
338. K. LYNCH, supra note 337, at 2-3, 123-28; C. PERIN, supra note 285, at 188-93.
339. Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems a/Aesthetic Regulation, 62
MINN. L. REv. 1, 16-21 (1977). The term and concept of polycentricity are developed in M. PO-
LANYI, THE LOOIC OF LIBERTY 114-22, 170-79 (1951).
340. C. PERIN, supra note 285, at 188-92. This may also be the case in countries nominally
much more centrally governed than the United States. In France, local officials often hold several
offices simultaneously, in different levels of government, and are thus able to use their influence at
the center to satisfy local needs. See France, U.S. Grapple with Decentralization, San Francisco
Chron., Mar. 3, 1982, at C-3, col. 1. I recently had occasion to speak with a law professor who was
teaching Baurecht (roughly, construction law, including land use planning and regulation) at the
University of Cologne. Despite Germany's quite detailed federal statutes concerning land plan-
ning and development, the opinion of this teacher was that "everything gets settled over a glass of
beer in the Ratskeller [city hall bar]." Interview with Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel in Cologne, West
Germany (May 14, 1982).
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we will be dealing with substantial local influence over land use deci-
sions for a long time to come. That this local influence requires some
safeguards beyond legislative coalition building was the main contribu-
tion of plan jurisprudence. But the principles that we use to guide local
land use controls should bear some relation to an underlying rationale
for local government. This Article has meant to suggest what that ra-
tionale might be and some of the principles that folow from it.
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